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Introduction' 
Regional policy would appear to have been less successful than policy-makers would like 
to thi nk. Despite an onslaught of policy measures from the 1960s onwards, spatial 
ineq ualities in Europe have proved obstinate, and thus the well-known diagnosis that 
regional policy is facing a "crossroads"l could seem to be an elegant understatement. 
Currently two policy paradigms co-exist. Traditional central-government 
programmes that single out particular distressed areas for preferential treatment through 
subsidies or infrastructure are still very much in evidence, but especially since the 1980s 
'bottom-up initiatives' from the regional level have become increasingly prominent, 
involving public-private partnerships and a wide range of advisory services . Within 
academia the division between traditional and new-model regional policy has given rise 
to two distinct analytical paradigms, each focusing on particular features of its associated 
policy paradigm but equally ill-suited to deal with initiatives rooted in 'the other' tradition. 
This rigid division of academic labour of course obstructs comparative studies of different 
policy measures and in effect makes it impossible to provide a systematic account for the 
origins, nature and consequences of the ongoing shift in policy paradigms. Therefore 
attempts to undertake analyses along these lines will require a new analytical framework, 
and in order to ensure the coherence of such a framework careful consideration must be 
given to the basic foundations upon which it is constructed. The current paper is devoted 
to this particular task. 
The aim is to establish some theoretical prerequisites for a subsequent elaboration 
of a conceptual framework for the study of regional policy. In order to be able to, at a later 
stage, develop a model of the policy process and the organisations and relationships 
involved, three key problems in social science of crucial importance to the policy area in 
general and the transition towards new-model regional policies in particular will be 
examined. 
• The first draft of this paper was written during a six-month spell in Scotland in 1995 . Thanks nre due 
to the Faculty of Arts. the Department of Languages and International Culture Studies , and the European 
Rcsenrch Unit, all at Aalborg University, for being supportive, financially and otherwise. The 
Department of Economics at Strathclyde University, Glasgow, again generously provided facilities and 
a stimulating environment in which to pursue my resenrch interests. The present paper benefitted from 
discussions "ith and comments from Cbris Moore, Kim Swales, and John Scouller. although the author 
remains responsible for the text in its present fonn. 
Albrechts et 01. 1989. 
As wi II become apparent, the general approach informing the text can be termed 
institutional. and the paper takes as its point of departure the proposition that 
a fundamental characteristic of any regional policy measure is that a public body attempts 
to influence the economic activities of private actors along spatial lines. 
This places the study of regional policy in a broader thematic context that involves at least 
three sets of issues of a more general nature, namely 
I) the relationship between public and private organizations, 
2) approaches to the analysis of public policy-making, and 
3) the means by which public bodies can influence private economic actors. 
One could hope that a critical examination of the associated bodies of literature will not 
only prove fruitful in the process of developing an alternative analytic framework for the 
study of regional policy, but also, perhaps, be of relevance in other fields of inquiry in 
which the relationship between public bodies and private firms is a central feature . 
The following pages set the scene by painting a more detailed picture of the current 
state of affairs with regard to regional policy and its analysis, and provide an outline of 
the structure of the paper. 
AI Ihe Crossroads 
Over the last decades spatial policy in Western Europe has changed in two important 
respects . 
It is evident that the complexity of the organizalional selling has increased 
dramatically. 2 The concept and practice of regional policy had originally been developed 
on the national level by central governments in order to promote a more equitable 
interregional distribution of economic activity, but from the 1980s onwards the 
predominance of national-level policies came under threat. From above the structural 
funds of the European Community put international redistribution on the agenda and 
imposed constraints on member-state policies. From below the growth of economic 
development activities of regions and local authorities created a new field of interregional 
competition: sub-national institution-building. And at the national level itself the pressures 
of an increasingly liberal ideological climate and the pervasiveness of structural change 
in the manufacturing industries combined to make large-scale spatial redistribution much 
2 For overviews of the development of regional policy in Western Europe, see Stohr 1989, Albrechts & 
S")'I1gedouw 1989. and Bachtler 1993 . 
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more difficult to sustain, both politically and financially. 
The nature a/public inten'enlion has, however, also been transformed since the 
1970s. Regional policy in its traditional form was organized on the national level by 
central government, consisted of a relatively small number of policy programmes, relied 
primarily on financial incentives supplemented by infrastructure provision and direct 
regulation, and operated mainly in a reactive and non-selective way. The traditional 
approach in other words involved public bodies using 'hard resources' to change the 
economic and institutional environment in which the private sector operated, but it still 
effectively left the initiative in individual investment projects with individual firms. While 
the structural funds of the European Commlll1ity to a large extent have employed methods 
similar to those already used by its member states, the policy programmes developed on 
the sub-national level involved rather different kinds of public intervention. The so-called 
bottom-up initiatives relied heavily on advisory services and the creation of public-private 
partnerships on the regional level, and in this type of new-model regional policy 'soft 
resources' were often employed in a pro-active and selective manner. Public bodies did 
in other words take initiatives designed to influence the strategic decision-making in 
particular segments of private firms and thereby advance not just the quantity of 
investment within the region, but also its quality with regard to e,g. organization, 
production processes and positioning on the market. 
While the situation has undeniably become much more complex, it is also clear that 
the widespread perception of a bewildering complexity of regional problems and policies 
also would appear to owe a great deal to difficulties of a more analytical nature, In short, 
I would argue that the visibility in and around the current "crossroads" has been more than 
a little impaired by the absence of adequate conceptual tools, capable of making sense of 
both policy regimes and hence accounting for the general relationship between the two 
and pennitting an analysis of the historical transition from traditional to new-model types 
of regional policy.3 In order to fully understand the origins of the presents problems of 
orientation, it is in other words necessary to take a closer look at the dominant paradigms 
in the academic study of regional policy. 
Analyses of the traditional regime of central government regional policy have 
primarily been undertaken in order to establish the effects of certain policies on the 
regional econornies. As both the traditional policies and the investment activities 
promoted lend themselves to quantification - in monies or employees - it is hardly 
surprising that econornists and quantitative methods have played a prominent role in the 
study of traditional regional policies. While sophisticated techniques were developed in 
3 For an extended I'ersion of the following argument, see Halkier 1996. 
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order to cope with the problems involved in estimating the economic impact of particular 
measures.' the relatively narrow range of standard policy programmes also meant that the 
differences between various policy measures could be determined by means of fairly 
simple conceptual tools. conveniently summed up by dichotomies such as 'strong or weak' 
regional policy regimes and often explicitly linked to more general approaches to 
economic policy such as 'laissez-faire versus planning' or 'liberalism versus 
interventionism' .s 
On this background it was to be expected that the shift towards new types of regional 
intervention from the 1980s would be more than a little difficult to come terms with from 
a traditional perspective, simply because the new-model measures were difficult to 
characterize by means of the existing analytic categories. Add to this the historical 
circumstances in which the transition took place - major cut-backs in national-level 
policies across Europe and a liberal ideological climate assumed to be inconsistent with 
strong regional policies - and it would indeed have been surprising if a certain measure 
of skepticism towards the bottom-up array of small-scale advisory services had not been 
in evidence in the early years. 
Eventually, the analysis of new-model policies in effect emerged as a separate 
discipline, employing a different set of methodologies" Given the very heterogenous 
nature of bottom-up initiatives in regional development, (semi-)qualitative methods - e.g. 
case studies or surveys via questionnaires - formed the foundation of much research in the 
area, and the study of regional policy therefore began to draw increasingly on the micro-
oriented techniques of management and organizational sciences.' Again much energy has 
been devoted to describing individual initiatives and appraising their impact on private 
firms , and although specific institutional features has necessarily been more prominent 
than in studies of traditional central-government policies, only limited progress has been 
made towards establishing a more general conceptual framework that would allow a 
systematic analysis of the differences and similarities between the various genres of new-
model initiatives . 
The present situation with regard to the academic study of regional policy can in 
4 For examples of this, see Moore & Rhodes 1973, Ashcroft 1980, Diamond & Spence 1983 , Folmer 
1986, Swales 1989, and Wren 1990. 
5 See e.g. Grant 1982. Ferguson 1988, Danson et al. 1990. 
6 It is interesting to Dote that nonetheless a certain cohabitation took place in the colurrms of e.g. Regional 
Studies , suggesting that functional and institutional interests in praxis have taken priority over 
methodological differences . 
7 The journal Entrepreneurship & Regional Development is a good illustration of the approach to the 
study of new-model regional policy. 
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other words be summed up as follows . The transition from one policy paradigm to another 
has been replicated as two distinct lines of academic enquiry, both primarily interested in 
establishing the economic effects of individual policy programmes, but polarized in terms 
of methodologies between aggregate quantitative studies and qualitative case studies and 
surveys , There are undoubtedly excellent historical explanations for this pattern - the 
institutional inertia of particular academic disciplines and the availability of external funds 
for policy evaluation to name the most obvious - but from a broader perspective this 
analytic polarization would still seem to be rather unhelpful. Firstly, comparison between 
different types of policy measures is hampered by the absence of a uniform conceptual 
framework that can account in a systematic fashion for the basic features of both policy 
regimes, Secondly, the focus on economic impact means that significant aspects of policy-
making such as methods of implementation and the institutional environment are often 
given only cursory attention. Thirdly, simplistic dichotomies of the market-versus-
intervention type inherited from analyses of traditional policy regimes are also part and 
parcel of political discourse, and hence they may eventually reveal more about conflicting 
ideologies and symbolic gestures than about the nature of the actual interaction between 
the public and the private sector. And fourthly, the study of the politics of regional policy 
is likely to remain neglected or at best undertaken in splendid isolation from the nature 
of the actual policy programmes, simply because the intrinsic and intricate distinctions 
between the different policy measures cannot be spelt out clearly.' Or to put it another 
way : by pursuing a well-defmed set of objectives of impact evaluation, the dominant 
traditions in the analysis of regional policy have produced a situation where the existing 
conceptual frameworks are perhaps suitable for their original tasks, but where they can 
certainly be found wanting if regional policy were to be tackled from other perspectives, 
Mapping a Road 
This conclusion has been reached in connection with an ongoing research project on new-
model regional policy and the politics of regional development, revolving around an in-
depth empirical study of the Scottish Development Agency set within the wider context 
of UK regional and industrial policy'" At an early stage it became clear that a prerequisite 
for pursuing this line of inquiry would be the construction of an alternative analytical 
8 This conunent only stresses the obvious limits upon the analysis of the political aspects of the policy 
process imposed by a murk)' and/or simplistic view of the nature of the policy progranunes, and does not 
imply adherence to a rationalistic view of the policy process in which the actors involved have perfect 
knowledge of the available options and their consequences, cfthe discussion below, 
9 Earlier publications stenuning [rom this work are Halkier 1992 and 1994, 
1 1 
framework. '" What was needed was a coherent set of concepts developed on the basis of 
a particular methodology; a set of concepts eschewing reductionist simplicities and being 
sufficiently multi-dimensional to account for the complexities of empirical analysis, but 
sti II capable of laying bare significant differences between various types of policies by 
highlighting central features of material consequence. Needless to say, much inspiration 
with regard to specific aspects of regional policy can be found in existing contributions, 
including work undertaken outwith the two dominant traditions ." But before embarking 
on the more detailed work of developing appropriate concepts to be employed in empirical 
analysis it will, however, be worthwhile to go 'back to basics' and address a number of 
fundamental questions in order to ensure the coherence of the framework. The purpose 
of this paper is therefore to develop a foundation for the development of an analytic 
framework for the study of changing regional policy paradigms and the associated 
political conflicts. 
On the basis of earlier work in this area, three fields of theoretical inquiry have been 
selected. The firsl section introduces the theoretical foundations of the research project 
by sketching the key assumptions about the role of institutions, organizations and agency 
in general, and in the study of politics and economic development in particular. It should 
be stressed that the purpose of this part of the text is to make it easier to follow the 
reasoning in the later and more specific sections rather than provide an extensive review 
of these heavily contested issues. Its fonnat therefore approaches that of a 'position 
statement' based on a discussion of central contributions on institutions (March & Olsen, 
North), institutional economics (Hodgson, North, Lundvall) and strategic-relational state 
theory (Jessop). Leaving the lofty spheres of grand theory behind, the second section of 
the paper discuss different approaches to the study of public policy-making in order to 
review their research strategies and methodological assumptions, and on the basis thereof 
a modified framework consistent with central institutionalist concerns will be proposed. 
The third section examines a critical element in the policy process, namely the means by 
which public-sector bodies try to influence private finns and individuals. The study of 
policy instruments is one of the least developed areas within policy studies, but on the 
basis of a discussion of different fonns of power, the section will explore how various 
types of policy instruments may affect the degree to which public goals are likely to 
prevail over private interests. On the basis of this, the general contours of an analytical 
framework that will allow a broader perspective on regional policy can be delineated, and 
the concluding section proposes a preliminary model of the policy-making process and 
10 For earlier versions of this framework. see Halkier 1991 and 1992 . 
II Cf the brief outline in Halkier 1992. and the extensive discussion in Halkier 1996. 
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the organisations and relationships involved - but, alas, leaves the detailed elaboration of 
individual variables to be completed elsewhere.12 
The overall format of the paper is thus perhaps a somewhat curious one: its ultimate 
purpose is external - to provide the foundation for another paper - and its internal structure 
is that of literature reviews of three separate, although of course related, areas . It is 
nonetheless hoped that the attempt to establish an institutionalist perspective on the 
relationship between public and private organizations in the policy process will not only 
provide coherence within the text but also make it relevant to a wider audience with 
research interests in other areas of public policy. 
12 See Ha1kier 1996. 
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I. State, Economy and Space - Institutional Perspectives 
The study of regional policy is essentially about a particular fonn of interaction between 
public bodies and private sector firms, and as the relationship between public and private 
has been one of the central problems in 20th century social science - and the major 
ideological dividing line in Western politics - no shortage of writings in terms of shelf 
kilometres can claimed. What we are looking for is , however, a body of thought not just 
drawing attention to the obvious differences between these two elements of society, but 
also capable of analyzing them within a unitary framework and establishing their 
similarities and modes of interaction. As already mentioned, it is hoped that an 
institutionalist approach will be able to ensure this. 
These days one may indeed be forgiven for a feeling of wariness when every other 
article and book within the social sciences starts out by proclaiming its adherence to 'the 
new institutionalism'. Apart from the, undoubtedly unintended, resemblance to the 
mandatory homage paid over the years to great founding fathers, such statements also 
suffer from the fact that the name has actually been used for separate theoretical traditions 
within economics, political science and other social science disciplines. Institutionalism 
is, in other words, a deceptively simple label that may indeed owe a good deal of its 
popularity to the comparative advantage of "relative obscurity":13 everyone think they 
know what Keynesian economics or Marxian state theory is all about whereas neo-
institutionalism can potentially function as a theoretical flag of convenience. A serious 
claim to a share in the current institutionalist surge must in other words be qualified 
through the specification of key concepts and their relationship to existing writings within 
the tradition. 
In the following this will be done in three steps. First the general questions of 
institutions, structures and actors will be addressed, and on the basis of this some 
implications for the study of state and economy, two key areas in the study of regional 
policy, will be elaborated upon. 
The New Inslillllionalism 
The current emphasis on institutions across the social sciences, often referred to as the 
'new institutionalism',14 undoubtedly owe a good deal to dissatisfaction with the major 
13 Hodgson 1989 p 24 . 
14 Although the epithet 'new' has hardly damaged the marketability of these trends , it does serve to 
(continued .. . ) 
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theoretical trends of the 1960s and 1970s in general, and their assumptions about the 
relationship between structures and agency in particular. In political science the 
institutionalist crusade of March & Olsen started with a twin-pronged attack upon 
reductionism,1l both within the behaviouralist tradition focusing upon individual political 
behaviour, and in the form of socio-centric state theory stressing the social origins of state 
activities rather than the importance of the latter in their own right. In economics the 
obvious target was the dominant neoclassical paradigm that effectively side-lines 
institutional issues through its methodological individualism and assumptions of rational 
and maximizing economic agents with complete information about the market. 16 Recent 
institutionalist writings have in other words not merely stressed that 'institutions matter', 
but also been concerned with the consequences of this claim for the relationship between 
social institutions and historical agents, and hence the following pages not only trace the 
thinking of prominent contributions from these traditions themselves but also draw upon 
other contributions to what has become known as the structure-agency debate. 
The term 'new institutionalism' in political science has been closely associated with 
the writings of lames March and lohan P. Olsen" who in their 1984 manifesto 
Organizational Factors in Political Life insisted that political institutions cannot be 
reduced to "arenas for contending social forces" because they are also 
collections of standard operating procedures and structures that define and defend 
interests. " 
From this perspective institutions are seen as "political actors in their own right", coherent 
and autonomous, and hence capable of moulding political preferences in society at large. 19 
Perhaps the combination of extensive polemic and a somewhat messianic tone 
explains the prominent status of this essay,20 functioning as a central point of reference 
for both adherents and critics of the institutionalist approach. Although some of the more 
specific criticism would certainly seem to cast doubts about whether March & Olsen 
14 ( ... continued) 
distinguish them from earlier institutionalist schools in both economics and political science, cf below. 
15 March & Olsen 1984. 
16 Hodgson (1989) performs a lively and thorough demolition job along these lines. 
17 Notably March & Olsen 1984 and 1989. The relationship between the 'new' and earlier generations of 
institutionalists in political science seems to be more indirect than is the case in economics (Rhodes 
1995) 
18 March & Olsen 1984 p 738. 
19 March & Olsen 1984 p 739. 
20 See e.g. Bogason 1989, Thomsen 1994, Lane 1995, and, acerbic but acute, Rhodes 1995 . 
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succeed in disentangling themselves from the reductionist traditions they lambast, 21 the 
crucial problem would seem to be that their key concepts remains highly ambiguous. 
Given their claim that organizational factors structure political institutions, a clarification 
of the relationship between these two sets of concepts would seem to be essential : Is this 
a two-way relationship or a case of one-way determination? And is it correct to assume 
a distinction between underlying abstract organizational features and specific historical 
interests, or are they operating on the same level of analysis? The absence of clear 
answers to basic questions like these could perhaps suggest that at the end of the day the 
research interest of March & Olsen is not so much the underlying structures themselves 
but rather the effects of particular political institutions on policy making and political 
behaviour.22 This is of course a perfectly legitimate interest - and indeed a highly relevant 
concern from the perspective of the study of regional policy - but so far the work of 
March & Olsen has clearly not resulted in the development of a general approach to the 
analysis of social institutions that could potentially constitute an adequate starting point 
for a unitary conceptual framework capable of analyzing both political and economic 
phenomena. The new institutionalism in political science would seem to be mainly of 
potential relevance for studies in certain areas of politics, and hence the search for a 
broader perspective must be continued against other self-proclaimed institutionalist 
traditions. 
A prominent figure in what has become known as the 'new institutional econornics'23 
is the Nobel laureate Douglas C. North whose work has mainly concentrated on patterns 
of economic growth and performance.24 According to North 
institutions are the rules of a game in a society .. , they structure incentives in human 
exchange, whether political, social, or economic." 
Institutions may have been consciously created and formalized like a constitution, or they 
may exist as conventional codes of social behaviour, but either way they "defme and limit 
21 Thomsen (1994) argues that strong reservations must remain about the implications of March & Olsen 
seeing institutional rules as limits to - and perhaps sole determinants of - political behaviour, seemingly 
replicating the problems of structuralism in being unable to explain social change because the of capacity 
of the structures to reproduce themselves. 
22 March & Olsen has undeniably inspired a number of empirical studies along this line, e.g. Hall (1986) 
on economic policy, and Anderson (1992) and Moore (1994) on regional development strategies. 
23 In contrast to the 'old institutionalism' that was the dominant trend in the US before the Keynesian 
revolution (see Petr 1984, cf Hodgson 1989 ch. I). 
24 For a brief critical introduction, see Villumsen 1994. 
25 Northl 99 lp3 . 
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the set of choices" '6 available to social actors and thereby reduce the fundamental 
uncertainty involved in having to negotiate a complex environment by means of a limited 
capacity to process information." In contrast to this, organizations - e.g. firms political 
parties, or churches - are defined as "groups of individuals bound by some common 
purpose", ~8 and according to North the interaction between organizations and institutions 
is a crucial feature of social and historical development. Organizations are created to take 
advantage of opportunities that exist because of the institutional make-up of society, and 
at the same time organizations are "major agents of institutional change",29 either through 
unforseen consequences of attempts to accomplish their own objectives or, more seldom, 
in the form of conscious attempts to change the rules of the game.30 
Although the North approach is not unproblematic, especially with regard to manner 
in which it has been applied to the analysis of economic development/ 1 some important 
advantages in comparison with March & Olsen are certainly evident. 32 Firstly, the 
distinction between institutions and organizations establishes two different levels of 
analysis, related yet separate, and thereby makes it possible to distinguish between 
underlying rules and specific historical processes. Secondly, although individual and 
collective actors operate on a terrain structured by the incentives of existing institutions, 
they would still seem to have a reasonable degree of leeway left to chose their strategies, 
and thus while institutions do structure social exchange, they do not reduces actors to 
'structural dopes'. And thirdly, the possibility of actors challenging existing institutions 
or creating new ones not only makes it possible to perceive the interaction between 
institutional structures and social agency as a two-way process, but also allows for 
institutional transformations occasionally to be the result of an intentional process. The 
most conspicuous problem in North's position concerns the general function of institutions 
where the potentially unequal distribution of incentives inherent in a particular institution 
tends to be overshadowed by the emphasis given to (the necessary and presumably 
26 North 199 1 P 4 . 
27 North 1991 ch. 3. 
28 North1991p5 . 
29 North 1991 p 5. 
30 North 1991 ch. 9. 
31 Although North stresses that in principle institutions do not exist because they are optimal from the 
perspective of economic efficiency (North 1991 pp 7f), this assumption would still seem to be implicitly 
present in some of his specific analyses (Villumsen 1994). 
32 The lack ofintemal coherence within 'new institutionalism' is underlined by the conceptual confusion: 
while structural properties are referred to as both institutions (North) and organizational features (March 
& Olsen), specific historical entities are referred to as both organizations (North) and institutions (March 
& Olsen). 
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uncontroversial) reduction of uncertainty. On an abstract level the conflictual nature of 
society is. in other words, being underplayed, and if the theory is to provide the 
underpinning for studies of political processes as well. this is highly unfortunate. Given 
the importance attached to institutional structuring of social incentives. this is, however, 
more a question of emphasis than an outright sin of omission. and hence North would still 
seem to provide a reasonable starting point for an institutional approach to the study of 
social phenomena, also outwith his original point of departure in economics and economic 
history. 
Institutions, Sin/Cll/res and Agency 
The above review has revealed significant differences in terms of theoretical ambition and 
achievement, but it must be stressed that common ground amongst the institutionalist 
traditions can be found with regard to their epistemolOgical position. Both March & Olsen 
and the new institutional economists accept the central claim of the realist tradition that 
the world exists independently of scientific theory. that specific social entities have 
specific properties, and that although 
we have no direct access to these properties, they are both constraining and facilitating in 
relation to other properties and they are indirectly accessible to knowledge.33 
Furthermore. both traditions attempt to construct positions that avoid both structural 
determinism and atomistic voluntarism. 
These feature are shared with other major contributions to the general discussion on 
structures and agency - Anthony Giddens' structuration theoryl4 and the so-called 
'strategic-relational' approach of Bob Jessop)' - and given the relative weakness of the 
input from the new political institutionalism, especially the latter could potentially provide 
significant additional input. In the following the attempt to formulate the general 
foundation for an institutionalist approach to the study of regional policy is undertaken 
by defining and elaborating upon three key concepts that will be employed in the ensuing 
approach to the study of the interaction of political and economic entities, namely 
institutions, actors, and organizations . 
InslilUlions are seen as sets of rules structuring social relations by defming options 
33 Jessop 1990 (italics added). For an extensive introduction to realist epistemology and social science, see 
Sayer 1984; cf Thomsen 1991 a and Halkier 1990a. 
34 Giddens' position has been repeatedly stated since the 1980s but The Constitution a/Society (1984) 
remains a locus classicus. 
35 Clearly stated in Jessop 1990 ch. 9. 
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and distributing the incentives associated with particular courses of action J • This means 
that institutions can be both limiting and enabling in that rules may are either prohibit, 
permit or require certain acts. J7 institutions may exist either as informal cultural norms or 
as highly formalized written procedures embodied in particular organizations vested with 
the power to institute and enforce them,38 but either way they are an inherently social 
phenomena that can only be reproduced through the continuous agency of the actors 
influenced by a particular set of rules J 9 While a general rationale for social institutions 
would seem to be the need for routinization in order to cope with information and decision 
overload,'o it is also clear that institutions may entail sets of actors amongst whom an 
unequal distribution of incentives can be found, and thus relations of power wilI often be 
involved in the sense that a particular rule may privilege some actors at the expense of 
others.41 
Actors in this scenario are specific historical entities, individual or collective, with 
a capacity for agency: being capable of having acted differently.42 Although the behaviour 
36 The resemblance with North's definition is obvious, although the use of the expression 'social relations' 
rather than 'social exchange' is intended to highlight the pervasive nature of institutional structuring of 
social interaction. North's position has, not surprisingly, been echoed by other institutional economists 
(e.g. Johnson & Lundvall 1989, and Hodgson 1989) and similar statements can be found in the writings 
of neo-institutional political scientist Peter Hall (1986 pp 191), and strategic-relationist state theorists 
(Thomsen 1991 b pp I 56ff, Hay 1995 pp 199ft). Giddens' defmition of social structures as "rules and 
resources" (1984 p 17) is in fact closely related because his defmition of resources as "the modes 
whereby transformative relations are actually incorporated into the production and reproduction of social 
practices" (1984 P 18) in effect appears to turn resources into a special type of rules. 
37 The insistence on structures being not just negatively limiting but also positively enabling from an actors 
perspective is widespread (e.g. Hodgson 1989 p 132, Jepperson 1991 , Thomsen 1994 p 13, Hay 1995 
p 2(0). Here the more precise distinction between prohibition etc. is employed, originally proposed by 
Bloomington public-choice theorist Elinor Ostrom (1986 pp 5f) as a prologue to an even more detailed 
typology of rules for use in micro-studies of social interaction. For an introduction to the thinking of the 
Bloomington school, see Bogason 1994. 
38 The role of informal or 'cultural' nonns is generally recognized (North 1991 pp 4ff, cb. 5; Hodgson 1989 
pp 123-34), but cf the discussion below it is essential to make an analytical distinction between the 
abstract institutional rules and the historical organizations that either uphold a specific rules or operate 
in accordance with them. 
39 Giddens argues this point forcefully as part of his structuration theory (1984 pp 25ft), but it would also 
seem to be fundamental to strategic-relationist state theory (Hay 1995 pp 199ft); neo-institutionalist 
cconomists such as North (1991 pp 81) certainly recognize the role of agency in the transfonnation of 
institutions, but the relationship between structures and actors somehow appears to be, for want of a 
better word, 'looser' than in the writings of Giddens and Jessop. 
40 Hodgson 1989 p 128. 
41 Giddens 1984 p 18, cfthe discussion of power below. 
42 Giddens 1984 p 9. 
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of actors is circumscribed by institutions," their agency through choice is still intact 
because institutions structure the environment of actors rather than determine their 
behaviour directly . .u The possibility of actors to influence their own circumstances would 
furth ermore seem to be enhanced by the historical co-existence of many institutions that 
makes it possible to 'escape' by moving from one set of social relations to another, and 
al so facilitates deliberate attempts to bring about institutional change by modifying or 
eliminating particular rules. At the same time it is, however, important to stress that the 
strategy of any actor will be limited by the resources available to them and their cognitive 
map of the environment in which they operate. Actors are not omniscient but guided by 
bounded rationality:45 they pursue their objectives on the basis of incomplete perception 
of the environment, limited by their vantage point and the resources involved in gathering 
and processing information, and thus the likeliness of constant or sudden challenges to 
existing institutional structures would still seem to be fairly limited. 
Organizations are defined as a collective actor, namely "groups of individuals bound 
by some common purpose",46 and like individual actors they operate in a strategic manner 
in relationship to a structured environment. Organizations may owe their existence to a 
variety of reasons: many will have been set up with a view to exploit opportunities or 
defend interests dermed by existing institutions,'7 but other organizations function as 
embodiment of a particular institution with the purpose of making other actors act in 
accordance with a specific set of rules. In both cases, however, it is important to underline 
that organizations differ from individual actors in that they incorporate social relations: 
their functioning involves not only interaction with a structured external environment, but 
also the operation of other sets of rules governing the internal workings of the 
organization. This points to a significant feature of organizations, namely the co-existence 
of parallel agendas where the official objectives in relation to the external world will 
compete with more internal objectives like defending resources or the interests of 
individual components of the organization. 
The inspiration, positive or negative, for these formulations is spelt out in the 
footnotes to the preceding paragraphs, but before moving on the task of applying these 
concepts to areas relevant from the perspective of regional policy, it is perhaps worth 
43 As social relations are a defining characteristic of society (cf Giddens 1984 ch. 1), it would take a hermit 
(or a suicide) to 'opt out' of them altogether. 
44 Ostrom 1986 pp SIT. 
45 Originally the sociologi st Henry Simon's expression (Hodgson 1989 pp 79ft), but central in !he 
Institutionalist critique of the neoclassical paradigm. 
46 North 199 1 p5 . 
47 North 1991 ch. 9. 
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briefly to indicate what appears to be the advantages of the position outlined above. 
Firstly, the conceptualization of the relationship between institutional structures on the 
one hand and social actors on the other hand clearly allows for mutual leverage - while 
institutions structure the envirorunent in which actors operate, agency will intentionally 
or otherwise reproduce, modity or discontinue particular rules - and thus the fundamental 
objective of establishing institutional structuring and historical agency as two separate, 
yet related, levels of enquiry has been achieved's Secondly, the potentially systemic 
nature of sets of rules entailed in an institution - rules may embody particular development 
tendencies or interact in complex patterns'9 - is underlined by the decision to denote 
general rules and specific collective actors by the Northian pair institution-organization 
rather than the organizational-feature/institution coupling of March & Olsen.'" Thirdly, 
it is worth recalling that the reemergence of the spectre of reductionism in the guise of 
structuralism has been made even more difficult by insisting on the co-existence of several 
institutions in a particular historical setting. And fourthly it is possible to understand 
social transformation as a open-ended structured process because change can either result 
from the strategic behaviour of individual actors and organization, be propelled by 
tendencies and tensions on the institutional leveL or - typically - be brought about through 
the complex interaction of developments on these two levels of analysis. Although the 
inspiration from not least new institutional economics and the strategic-relationist school 
is of course very much in evidence, it is still hoped that this platform is not only suitable 
for its immediate purpose but could perhaps also prove useful in the context of other 
empirical research projects by charting a fruitful road between the large-scale conceptual 
engineering projects of Jessop and Giddens on the one hand and the more minimalist 
approach of Douglas North. 
Economy, Institutions and Space 
Over the last century a prominent feature of the social SCIences, institutionalist or 
otherwise, has been the attempt to distinguish between major areas of social exchange that 
function on the basis of different 'standard operation procedures', incentives and 
48 Despite the structuralist and other excesses marring the marxist tradition, it is tempting to recall one of 
the founding father's most perceptive and oft-quoted statements, namely that "people make history, but 
not in conditions of their O\\TI choosing". 
49 For a discussion of this from a macro-historical perspective, see Halkier 199Gb. 
50 Stressing the systemic nature is actually closer to the thinking of the strategic-relational tradition (Jessop 
et al.) because institutions in North's writings tends to be relatively simple constructs. This effect could 
also have been achieved by using the word structures to denote sets of rules, but despite - or perhaps 
because - the efforts of Anthony Giddens to rid this concept from its structuralist connotations, this 
option was still considered to be less attractive. 
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rationalities. While most writers have concentrated on one particular set of institutions 
- Smith, Marx and Schumpeter on the economy, Weber and Easton on politics, and 
Habermas on civil society - these were analyzed in contrast to other spheres of human 
activity, and thus the vast majority of empirical and theoretical work undertaken in the 
various fields of social science ex- or implicitly recognize the existence of such large-
scale "institutional orders" .5! Not surprisingly, such endeavours have also been a central 
feature of the various institutionalisms/2 and hence the following analysis will take as its 
point of departure the distinction between economic institutions on the one hand and 
political institutions on the other hand. 
Beginning with an outline of basic institutional features of the former, the text draws 
its inspiration from both institutionalist economics in general (North, Hodgson), and 
institutionalist-oriented studies of technological change (Lundvall) and spatial 
development (Scott & Storper) in particular. The result of this exercise is set to differ 
substantially from the traditional neoclassical perspective which assumes that the world 
is inhabited by rational maximizing economic agents who act on perfect information about 
prices in a situation with static technologies and preferences. 53 Consequently a long list 
of common phenomena has to be 'bracketed off' as market failures54 because they are at 
odds with the focus of the core model on movements towards market equilibrium, and 
hence the neoclassical tradition from the outset in fact limits itself to a relatively narrow 
field of inquiry. 
In contrast to this, institutionalists have defined the economic sphere of social 
activity as the production and exchange of goods and services and insisted on seeing the 
development of preferences and technologies as integrated parts of the economic system. 55 
While neoclassical economics sees the market as the institution of economic coordination 
and a mechanism furthering efficiency and growth, 
(the) fundamental institutionalist proposition is that it is the whole organizational structure 
of the economy which effectively allocates resources and distributes income, not just the 
market mechanism. 56 
Starting instead from the concept of transaction costs, a rather different perspective has 
been developed on both economic institutions and, not least, economic development and 
51 Giddens 1984 p 3 L 
52 Bogason 1989 pp 221 II 
53 See Johnson & Lundvall 1989, Hodgson 1989 p xiv, and Gee 1991. 
54 See e.g. Mi1grom & Roberts 1992 pp 73ff 
55 Hodgson 1989 pp 15ff 
56 Fosler1991p2lL 
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change . While the tenn obviously refers to the difficulties involved in setting up and 
carrying out the exchange process, two different approaches have developed. Douglass 
North and others have emphasized quantifiable transaction costs, i.e. 
the costliness of information . . (in) measuring the valuable attributes of what is being 
exchanged and the costs of protecting rights and policing and enforcing agreementsH 
An advanced application of this is the elaborate typology developed by Milgrom & 
Roberts, distinguishing between coordination and motivation costs and introducing five 
dimensions that will influence an actor's handling of the problem of incomplete 
infonnation. l ' The operational nature of this approach is, however, also a weakness, 
because if transaction costs were quantifiable they could be accommodated within a 
neoclassical market framework, 59 and this would actually undennine another central 
institutionalist proposition, namely that transaction costs can explain the occurrence of 
non-market economic organizations such as the finn 6 0 Instead Hodgson argues that the 
much more radical notion of structural uncertainty must be taken into account, too, 
namely 
lack of information about the fundamental nature of the problem and the type of outcomes 
that are possible61 
The reason for this is that invoking structural uncertainties in the markets for labour, 
goods and services is the only way in which transaction costs can explain the widespread 
abandoning of market exchange in favour of non-market types of control by economic 
actors.62 Although liberal thinking has seen markets and private finns as two sides of the 
same coin, the institutional features of the two are profoundly differene3 markets by 
definition involve free and recurring exchange of particular goods between many 
individual actors in order to allow the price mechanism to function, while finns are 
hierarchic organizations with built-in relations of power between owners, managers and 
57 North 1991 p 27. 
58 Milgrom & Roberts 1992 pp 28ff 
59 Hodgson 1989 p 20 I, Foster 1991 pp 224fT. The integration of transaction costs and neoclassical 
perspectives appears to be a central ambition of Milgrom & Roberts (1992). 
60 If transaction costs were quantifiable and hence calculable like production costs, presumably markets 
for information would develop and make non-market organizations like finns superfluous. 
61 1989 p 204. 
62 For a discussion of the shortcomings of the traditional institutionalist interpretation of the origins of the 
finn position developed by Coase and Williamson, see Hodgson 1989 pp 199-212. 
63 The follo\\ing line of argument is based on Hodgson (1989 pp 172-79, 203-12) and North (1991 ch. 9). 
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employees . A finn may opt to use market exchange to further its interests, but other 
strategies are also available. e.g. internalization of sub-contractors through acquisition or 
customized production for long-tenn private or public clients, and while all these activities 
will at some point involve money as a medium of interaction, these fonns of private 
exchange must not be confused with a market relation in the proper sense of the word. 64 
This does not imply that non-market organizations like firms are inherently superior 
means of organizing economic exchange,·' but rather that in practice the position of the 
market as an institution of exchange is highly contested one. And when markets are not 
seen as inherently superior, but rather as just one possible solution to the problem of 
economic exchange in a situation with an elaborate division of labour, the neoclassical 
concept of 'market failure ' becomes redundant - or restricted to the vocabulary ofliberal 
ideology. 
Processes of qualitative economic change based on technological innovation have 
been difficult to accommodate within a neoclassical framework where price signals are 
the only transmitters of infonnation:· but such phenomena have been at the hear of the 
institutionalist venture. 67 Lundvall and others have developed the concept of the 'organized 
market' which 
involves the parties in a process of interactive learning which is an important input into the 
process of innovation . . (and) integrates, through control and cooperation, a critical part 
of (the) environment and makes it less uncertain." 
As innovations become more complex and systemic in nature, the communication 
processes between users and producers become more extensive and complicated, and 
therefore technological change will often depend on durable and selective user-producer 
relations of a non-market nature 6 ' 
The notion of 'organized markets' - effectively non-market relations - can be seen as 
a, perhaps particularly successful, example of the more general claim made by 
institutionalists that economic development is 'path dependent' :'o technologies and 
64 Hodgson 1989 ch. 8, cf Johnson & Lundvall 1989 pp 92fT. 
65 Especially the attempt of Oliver Williamson to explain the emergence of firms by meanS of a transaction· 
cost approach appears to assume a tendency in institutions and organizations to develop in direction of 
greater efficiency. cf Villumsen (1994 pp 37m and Hodgson (1989 pp 199fl). 
66 Johnson & LWldvall 1989 pp 97f 
67 E.g. North 's work on economic history and LWldvall et 01. on the organization of the innovation process. 
68 Johnson & LWldvall 1989 p 94 . 
69 Johnson & LWldvali J 989 pp 95-102. 
70 North 199 J P 93. Villumsen 1994 p 43 . 
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production systems tend to continue developing in a particular direction, even when this 
path may ultimately be less efficient than other alternatives . Firms and other economic 
actors are not free to choose optimal solutions but operate on the basis of 'bounded 
rationality'. Their options are limited not only by incomplete and costly information and 
self-reinforcing economic factors - fixed investments, learning and coordination effects 
that privilege particular in-groups of actors71 - but also by the broader institutional and 
organizational framework in which the process takes place. The notions of capitalism as 
'a learning economy' does in other words not guarantee economic or technological 
development because while the dis-equilibria of 'organized markets' may sometimes be 
a precondition for development, 72 the organizational and institutional setting may also 
propel actors in other directions: 
Whether the most promising (short-run profitable) alternative is investing in piracy, 
cClnstructing an oil cartel, or developing a more high-power chip for computers, it is the 
existing constraints and changes in incentives at the margin that determine opportunitiesB 
More or less honourable pursuit by the moral standards of Protestant capitalism that may 
be perfectly rational from the perspective of a particular actor, but some of which would 
nonetheless seem to leave a lot to be desired in terms of long-term economic development. 
The adaption of an institutional perspective should make it easier to analyze the 
relationship between public and private organizations in terms of rules, resources, 
rationalities and incentives. On the most abstract level it is clear that in a situation of 
extensive social division of labour the interaction between independent producer 
organizations (firms) requires the presence of institutions such as e.g. property rights and 
markets,74 and that these sets of rules must be embodied in particular organizations. 
Historically, the task of rule enforcement has generally fallen to state bodies due to their 
external third-party nature,71 and thus the functioning of the economy depends upon the 
presence of particular political organizations. This idea is captured in the notion of 
economic institutions having polilicai condilions of exislence, 76 and is an important pillar 
71 North 1991 p 94. 
72 Storper el al. cf Ernste & Meier 1992 p 270. 
73 North 1991 p 100. 
74 North 1991 ch. 6 & 7, Hodgson 1989 pp 182-94. 
75 External, that is, to most of the Individual producers, not necessarily to the economy as such, cf the 
discussion below. 
76 The notion of ' conditions of existence' does not stem from institutional economics, but has been inspired 
by earlier work (Hallcier 1990b) in an related field, the mode-of-production debate. Here I argued, 
elaborating on an argument by Hindess & Hirst (1975 pp 13ft), that a 'minimalist Marxism' with 
(continued ... ) 
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supporting the central contention of institutional economics that the direction and pace of 
economic development depends on institutional and organizational features in both the 
economic and political spheres of society. The ultimate implication the notion of political 
conditions of existence is of course that economic dysfunction for political reasons 
becomes a distinct possibility because the effective presence of rule-enforcing 
organizations cannot be taken for granted as these have to be established and maintained 
through social and political conflicts. 
The adoption of an institutional perspective also has consequences with regard to the 
explanation of economic discrepancies between regions. While neoclassical economists 
have seen spatial inequalities as a question of 
comparative advantage (based on pregiven endowments), market exchange, and 
concomitant spatial flows of capital and labour .. where regional inequalities will become 
nothing more than temporary and self-correcting aberrations77 
writings inspired by the institutionalist approach have maintained that both path-
dependency and the local institutional and organizational setting have a critical impact on 
the spatial distribution of economic activity. The prospects of economic prosperity for a 
particular region will in others words depend on hitherto backgrounded or overlooked 
factors such as the nature of inter-fum transactions, the organizational framework for 
innovation and the labour market, regional business cultures, and the interplay between 
public and private actors on the regional level. 78 
76 ( ... continued) 
emphasis on the 'non-economic conditions of existence' of particular economic modes of productions 
seems to stand a better chance of surviving empirical scrutiny than does more elaborate models that 
incorporate both economic and non-economic social relations in extensive functionalist structures. 
Similarly, it should perhaps be pointed out that the position adopted above also differs from that fOlUld 
in the various traditions of regulationist economics - often used to complement a strategic-relational 
approach to politics (e.g. Jessop 1990 and Bertramsen el al. 1991) - where 'regimes of accumulation' 
require the presence of corresponding 'modes of regulation' in the form of "an institutional ensemble and 
complex of norms" (Jessop 1988 p 150). The institutionalist position as delineated here would appear 
to be less 'systemic' in that it invokes specific 'conditions of existence' rather than more elaborate 'modes 
of regulation'. 
77 Scott & Storper 1992 p 9. 
78 Scott & Storper 1992 pp I Iff, cf Morgan 1995 and Albrechts & S,,)ngcdouw 1989. Although the 
regional version of institutional economics has been closely associated with the study of 'industrial 
districts' such as 'the third Italy' or Western Jutland and these sometimes are given paradigmatic status 
(e.g. Hirst & Zeitlin (eds.) 1989), the relevance of these considerations has clearly been demonstrated 
in other, more extroverted, regional economies as well, cf Morgan's analysis of the Welsh case (1995). 
Hopefully a long-term side-effect of the widespread interest in the third Italy will be to stimulate interest 
in the institutional environment of regional development and thus contribute to bringing about a much-
(continued . . ) 
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Politics. Imtil1ltions and Space 
The above discussion of economic institutions has been greatly aided by the possibility 
of relying on a simple dichotomy between the dominant neoclassical paradigm and 
institutional economics. In political science the academic landscape appears. 
An appropriate starting point would., however, be the developments in the 1950s that 
broadened the field of study and took political science beyond its original emphasis on 
constitutional and other formal aspects of the political process. In David Easton's The 
Political System politics was defined as "the study of the authoritative allocation of values 
for a society",79 and, as illustrated by Figure 
I, his model of the political system 
emphasized the relationship between the 
political system and its external environment 
by focusing on the inputs of specific 
demands and general support, and outputs in 
the form of decisions and policies. The 
functionalist implications of Easton's model 
The 
political 
system 
have often been pointed out'O - the political Figur 1. Easton's model of the political 
system resembles a problem-solving machine system. Source: Easton 1965 p 32. 
that responds to demands by means of remedial actions and thereby generates support and 
new demands in an never-ending loop - but the basic idea of exploring the links between 
various parts of the political process became a central aim in many of the approaches to 
political science that flourished in the 1960s and 1970s. As argued in the March & Olsen 
manifesto,8i many of these traditions have conceptualized the relationship between actors 
and institutions in ways that are unsatisfactory from an institutionalist perspective - e.g. 
atomism in behavioural ism and public choice, or reductionism and structuralism in 
marxist state theory - and hence there would seem to be good reasons for developing an 
alternative. Given the current, largely programmatic, state of the new political 
institutionalism, the most negotiable route would, however, appear to go via a body of 
political theory written outside institutionalism as such, but in which the relationship 
between institutions and social actors is conceived in a manner than comes close to the 
78 ( ... continued) 
needed expansion of the methodological horizon of regional economics . 
79 Easton 1953 p 129. 
80 See Andersen 1991 ch. 2. 
8 I 1984 pp 735-38. 
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institutionalist position outlined above. The strongest candidate for this task is what has 
become known under the somewhat cumbersome name of strategic-relational state 
theory," in practice synonymous with works written or inspired by Bob Jessop.' ) 
If politics concerns "the constitutive decisions which bring about a specific 
structuration of social life", '4 then the state assumes a pivotal role in this area of social 
activity. Jessop defines the state as a distinct ensemble of institutions and organizations 
whose socially accepted function is to define and enforce collectively binding decisions on 
the members of a society in the name of their common interest or general will ." 
Although not couched in the language of institutionalism, the character of the state as 
embodying rules that structure social relations comes clearly across, and thus the state can 
be identified as the central political institution. The following pages outline the 
consequences of these formulations for I) the study of politics, 2) the relationship 
between economic and political phenomena, and 3) the spatial dimension of politics. 
The definition of the state adopted above may serve as a way of structuring the study of 
political phenomena.86 On the one hand it is possible to distinguish between three different 
processual aspects: 
- external influences on the state stemming from the dual demands of acting in the 
name of common interests and at the same time maintaining the overall social 
acceptance (legitimacy) of its functions, 
- internal influences related to the process of interpreting la volonllfe generale and 
implementing political decisions, and 
82 For a succinct statement of the strategic-relational position in the structure-agency debate, see Hay 1995 
pp 199ff. The highly pragmatic argument - that Jessop et al. appear to offer a short-cut towards an 
adequate conceptual framework - should not be construed as a rejection in principle of the possibility of 
cons tructing a reasonable starting point on the basis of the writings of the new institutionalism. At 
present the best alternative to the strategic-relational approach as a non-institutionalist starting point 
could well be the work of Helmut Willke, cf Pedersen 1994 and Jessop 1990 pp 320ff. 
83 Jessop's Slate Theory (1990), a collection of partly revised essays stemming mainly from the 1980s, 
provides fusthand insight into the development of the central figure in the tradition, while Bertrarnsen 
el al. 's Slate. Economy & Society brings together insights from regulationists economics, Laclavian 
discourse analysis , and Jessopite strategic-relationism. 
84 Bertramsen el ar 199 I p 27. Although the authors declared intention is to contribute to "a radical 
blurring of the lines of demarcation between state, economy and society" (p 6) and the lines back to 
Easton's definition are e\'ident, this Jessopist definition actually manages to add a much-needed edge to 
the classical formulation by stressing the institutional aspect of politics . 
85 Jessop 1990 P 34 I. 
86 Jessop 1990 pp 345ff. 
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INSTITUTIONAL! Input F onns of representation 
ORGANIZATIONAL 
Withinput Internal organisation 
Output Forms of intervention 
STRATEGIC Underlying Social base of state power 
Inner-dwelling State project (boundaries, inner unity) 
Overarching Discoursive hegemonic project 
Figur 2 Dimensions of the political process. Source: Jessop 1990 pp 345.fj. 
- external consequences of state activities, both in tenns of enforcing collectively 
binding decisions and maintaining legitimacy. 
On the other hand it will be necessary to employ two analytical strategies that complement 
each other by focusing on structures and agency respectively, namely: 
- an institutional/organizational perspective that involves the study of the basic rules 
and organizational aspects of the political process, and 
- a strategic perspective where focus is on the behaviour of individual and collective 
actors in relationship to the political process. 
By combining processual aspects and analytical strategies Jessop anives at six dimensions 
that can be employed in the analysis of the state,87 summarized in Figure 2. 
Looking at the fonnal aspects of the political process first, it should be underlined 
that the state is '"a selective terrain" where not only the rules governing representation but 
also the internal principles of organization may give priority to certain actors and interests 
at the expense of others, depending on e.g. the electoral system, the role of organized 
interests in the policy-making process, the constitutional relationship between the different 
tiers of government, and the territorial organization of the executive. The internal 
organization of state bodies since some point in the 19th century's has generally resembled 
87 Perhaps tongue-in-cheek, Jessop the state theorist remarks that this is of course only a short-cut for those 
'" impatient with conceptual hierarchies" that "has some merits" for " less ambitious purposes" (1990 p 
345). As will hopefully become apparent, it therefore sits well with the attempt of the present text to 
establish a foundation for development of a conceptual framework for empirical studies, not just with 
regard to its ability to structure the analysis of the political process, but also in terms of the level of 
theoretical ambition involved. 
88 This te:\1 deliberately avoids the question of the historical origins of the modem bureaucratic state and 
(continued ... ) 
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the Weberian ideal type of bureaucracy with impersonal authority vested in a hierarchy 
of offices employing salaried professionals,89 although some public organizations 
operating on the edges of the state apparatus have drifted towards other organizational 
models. That the state must be embodied in a particular set of organizations also means 
that parts of the state apparatus may generate their own interests and preferences, not just 
in terms of securing jobs and influence for a particular office,90 but also in the form of 
competences and standard operating procedures that may be more compatible with some 
policy measures than with others. 91 As the output of the state is supposedly to be enforced 
on members of society, the concept of power and the forms of intervention become 
pi votal, especially in studies where the relationship between public and private actors 
takes centre stage, and therefore these issues will be dealt with at greater length in a 
subsequent section of the present paper. 
Turning to the strategic aspects, it should first be noted that also political actors 
operate on the basis of bounded rationality in a situation of incomplete information and 
ubiquitous transaction costs, and that this applies both to political parties and interest 
organizations in their attempts to gain influence, and to the state organizations when 
trying to device policy measures that can promote whatever is defmed as the common 
interest. Strategic political behaviour can be ascribed to groups and organizations both 
external and internal to the state apparatus, and their strategies may concern either specific 
policy outputs or relate to the state itself by questioning its boundaries, irmer unity or the 
basic rules governing its operations. As preservation of the legitimacy of the state is 
essential for the functioning of the political process, a central task for the state and major 
political forces will be to establish and maintain a hegemonic project through 
(the) discourses which define the illusory community whose interests and social cohesion 
are to be managed by the state ... (and thereby provide) political, intellectual and moral 
guidelines for the conduct of state policyn 
It should perhaps be noted that having brought in the notion of discourse does not imply 
88 ( .. continued) 
its relationship to the development of capitalism. The traditional intimate coupling of capitalism and 
bourgeois democracy in traditional Marxism is certainly open to criticism, and the position of Nicos 
Poulantzas, the intellectual stimulus behind Jessop's writings, on these maUers certainly no Jess so; see 
Poulantzas 1975 pp 157-68, 173-80 cfHalkier 1990b. 
89 Ham & Hill 1984 ch. 3. 
90 Lane 1995 ch. 2. 
91 Ham & Hill 1984 ch. 8. 
92 Jessop 1990 p 346. 
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a last-minute introduction of a 'linguistic tum'! ' but is merely a pragmatic recognition or 
the material importance of the ways in which the world is depicted and perceived for the 
process of political continuity and change. 
With regard to the question of the relationship between political and economic 
phenomena, the proposed delimitation of politics and the definition of the state adopted. 
would at first glance appear to create an ambiguous theoretical situation. Despite the 
constant extolling of the virtues of institutionalism as a way of imposing a unitary 
perspective on the study of political and economic phenomena, the present text has clearly 
not established a clear-cut line of demarcation between the political and economic spheres 
of society. By contrasting authority and production the core areas of poli tics and 
economics may have been separated, but at the same time the scope for overlap in the 
form of e.g. politically authorized production of goods or services is also considerable. 
Obviously the direct cause for this muddle is that two spheres are not defined by means 
of symmetrical criteria.94 The economy is delimited alongfunctionallines as a particular 
type of material activity distinct from consumption, whereas politics is identified as a 
specific principle for resource aI/a cation, namely decisions imposed on behalf of the 
community as a whole - as opposed to private forms of interaction such as e.g. market 
exchange. The problems of delimitation may appear to be an ambiguity caused by lack of" 
intellectual rigour, but in the following I shall argue that this inserts the historically tense 
and awkward relationship between political and economic activities into a broader 
institutional framework and thereby in fact provides useful insight into the relationship 
between these two spheres of modem society. 
Although graphic depictions of multi-dimensional social phenomena are as prone as 
spatial metaphors to be unduly simplistic,95 it is hoped that Figure 3 will provide a useful 
illustration of the following argument. 
Firstly , the difference between the economic and political spheres of society with 
regard to their mode of operation must again be emphasized: while the exercise of public 
authority is a defining characteristic of politics, the modem capitalist economy is based 
on private exchange between individual or collective actors, market- or otherwise. The 
incongruity between the basic rules is of fundamental importance because it imbues the 
organizations and individual actors operating in the two areas with profoundly different 
rationales and objectives: individual or collective producers pursuing private prosperity 
93 For a paradigmatic statement of Essex·style discourse analysis in politics, see Laclau & Mouffe 1985 . 
For critical evaluations, see Jessop 1990 pp 288-304. Thomsen 1991a, Halkier 1987 and I 990a. 
94 For a discussion of possible principles for the delimitation of the public sector, see Lane 1995 ch. L 
95 The notorious base-superstructure distinction in some.marxist uaditions immediately springs to mind, 
cf Halkier 1990b. 
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versus the state championing common interests. Secondly, 
despite their different institutional characteristics it must also 
be stressed that the two spheres are mutually dependent. On the 
one hand the state is materially supported by resources 
generated in the economy, and on the other hand economic 
activity could not exist without the enforcement of the rules 
governing e.g. market exchange and property rights, and the 
upholding such conditions of existence for the productive 
system has usually fallen to the state as matters of public 
interest. 
.. firms as actors 
Thirdly, political demands for social equality with regard Figur 3. ~oli~ics .and the
d . . economy: InstItutIOns an 
to e.g. educatIOn, health, or transportatIOn may take the organizations. 
operations of the state itself into areas that unequivocally are of 
an economic nature because they involve the production of services. 96 This creates a 
'chequered' zone of engagement between the political and economic spheres in which their 
respective rationales will collide as organizations strive to promote their respective 
interests. Fourthly, most states have also assumed the role of regulator of economic 
activities on a more detailed basis in order to achieve common goals that private producers 
could not be expected to pursue in an efficient manner if left to their own devices. 
Institutionalist have tried to identifY the areas in which state regulation is essential or most 
likely by distinguishing between different types of goods along two dimensions, 
subtractability and exclusion, 97 where subtractability refers to the degree to which one 
person's consumption of a particular good limits that of any other individual, and 
exclusion refers to the possibility of and cost involved in excluding additional consumers 
once a good has been produced. As can be seen from Figure 4, this divides goods into four 
main categories of which one, public goods, requires political action to be produced 
because of the inherent free-rider problem: why pay for something that is readily available 
anyway? In other categories political regulation may be required to ensure provision in 
the long term - for example by preventing individual actors from exhausting common-pool 
goods through overuse, by safeguarding supply and controlling prices of toll goods in 
situations of monopoly, or by achieving broader social goals like e.g. employment 
opportunities98 - but at the same time their ambiguous nature also ensures that such 
96 From this perspective the only element of the welfare system that does not involve the state in economic 
activities would be purely financial forms of social support. 
97 Kiser & Ostrom 1982 pp 195-20 I. 
98 For an extensive discussion. see Lane 1995 pp 23-32. 
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SION 
COSTS High Common-pool goods Public goods 
(ground water, fish in ocean) (security, pollution control) 
Figur 4. Subtractability and exclusion. Source: Kiser & Ostrom 1982 p 192. 
intervention is likely to involve direct conflicts between the common interests embodied 
by the state and the private interests of individual economic actors. 
Fijihly, the inherent limitations to effective state intervention in the economy must 
be stressed. A basic feature of industrial capitalism is the institutional and organizational 
separation of the state on the one hand and a large number of private producers on the 
other hand. As the state has no direct role in the organization of large parts of the 
production process, most of its economic interventions are destined to be either a 
posteriori remedial reactions,99 or a priori attempts to influence private actors indirectly 
by changing the incentive structure - neither of which guarantees a successful outcome 
from the perspective of the regulating political body.l°O Moreover, as Jessop points out, 
the state 
responds to the political repercussions of any economic crisis rather than to the crisis as 
such lOI 
and thus the ever-present transaction-cost induced difficulties in identifYing the causes of 
a particular economy-related problem are exacerbated by the political nature of policy 
making.102 Economic policies are in other words mostly reactions to political articulation 
of particular problems, and this gives short-term economic and political interests and the 
dominant discourses and ideologies a significant influence on the pattern and effectiveness 
of state intervention. 
All in all we have a situation where the relationship between political and economic 
institutions is potentially conflictual - due to their different institutional nature - and 
where this potential is likely to surface in a conspicuous manner because the relationship 
99 Jessop 1990 p 356. 
100 Cf the discussion of policy instruments below. 
101 Jessop 1990 p 156. 
102 Cf the discussion of policy objectives in Halkier 1996. 
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is not just voluntary and external, but in fact compulsory and intimate . Economic and 
political organizations are inherently dependent upon one another, and the logic of the 
common interest is likely to generate a political drive towards extended regulation of 
private economic activities and the development of state-initiated economic activities, and 
thus the scene has been set for penn anent, pervasive and uneasy interaction . The 
historically recurring conflicts between individual and collective actors, focusing on the 
nature of political intervention or the redrawing of the borders of political organizations 
vis-a-vis the rest of society, would thus in the end seem to have been illuminated by the 
ambiguous delimitation of political and economic activities rather than obscured. 
Turning to the spatial dimensions of politics, it is again helpful to employ the 
distinction between organizational and strategic aspects. From a formal perspective, multi-
tier political systems is a feature of most modem societies, and thus the basic structure of 
the state entails the possibility of conflicts with a spatial dimension between lower-tier 
bodies and national-level organisations and internally amongst the fonner. The 
relationship between public bodies has been an area in which writings inspired by or 
bordering on institutionalism occupy an important place,I.) and Rhodes has argued that 
also political actors on the sub-national level may be able to device strategies that can 
promote the perceived interests of their local area, even vis-a-vis central government, by 
employing the rules governing the exchange of resources between public organisations to 
their advantage. The way in which space enters the political process does in other words 
not only depend upon formal aspects such as the constitutional distribution of decision-
making capacity, but also very much on the strategies and behaviour of the actors 
involved, both on the national and sub-national level. Obviously, the relative position of 
a local elite with regard to economic strength, social cohesion and political organization 
can make a difference, but so can the presence and intensity of regionalism or separatism 
as an alternative state project that may threaten a unitary political system and its 
associated integrative nationalist discourse. 
Historically, nationalism and the idea of equal rights for all citizens have been 
prominent elements of the hegemonic discourse in most industrialized countries,I04 and 
with the extended, socialized, version of citizenship offered by the post-1945 welfare 
states, regional economic equalities acquired a potential for becoming destabilizing issues 
that could be incorporated in the political strategies of both national and sub-national 
103 R. A. W. Rhodes' development the so-called power-dependence framework has proved to be seminal 
(1981, 1988 ch. 2), Anderson (1992) is a major study undertaken along these lines, and the work of 
Chris Moore moves along similar lines (Moore & Booth 1989, Moore 1994). 
104 See e.g. Smith 1991 , Hobsbawn 1990, and Hedetofi 1995 . 
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political actors . While spatial policies designed to address economic differences could 
appear to be the obvious answer to this type of political demands, such policies certainly 
also have the potential for becoming controversial in their own right. Other regions may 
resist preferential treatment to a particular area, political actors may oppose measures 
perceived to run counter to their ideological values, and thus government initiatives may 
be obstructed - or reduced to mere symbolic gestures that may deal with the political 
problem in a short-term perspective but leaves the underlying structural economic 
weakness intact. Like other forms of state intervention, regional policy cannot be taken 
for granted. 
This chapter set out to locate a unitary framework for the study of interaction 
between public and private organizations, a framework capable of accounting for social 
transformations as an open-ended structured process from a non-reductionist perspective. 
In order to reach this goal, the first theoretical obstacle to be negotiated was to 
reformulate a number of general concepts such as institutions, actors and organizations. 
The point of departure was to delineate a minimalist institutionalism that erthanced a 
N orthian position with insights from strategic relationism, Bloomington-style rational 
choice and structuration theory, and a key important result was the insistence upon the 
necessity of employing two separate, but connected, levels of analysis : the institutional 
level inhabited by abstract social rules and the historical level occupied by individuals and 
organizations as social actors. Hereby the reformulation, hopefully, maintained clarity 
while introducing more complex, conflictual and systemic features into the institutionalist 
perspective. 
Armed with the results of this general theoretical inquiry, a review of literature 
inspired by the new economic institutionalism highlighted the importance of transaction 
costs, non-market economic relationships, and the political conditions of existence on 
which economic institutions rely. With regard to the analysis of political phenomena, 
Jessop's strategic-relationism filled the gap left by the new political institutionalism, and 
this lead to the stressing of institutionaVorganizational and strategic perspectives as two 
complementary approaches . By connecting the institutional analysis of economic and 
political phenomena, it was finally possible to locate the roots of the 'permanent, 
pervasive and uneasy' interaction between economic and political organizations in a 
combination of conflicting institutional rationales, overlapping functional spheres and 
mutual material dependency. 
All in all the chapter would thus seem to have succeeded not only in establishing a 
unitary framework capable of accounting for political and economic phenomena and their 
interaction, but also in underlining the conflicts irtherent in this process. These insights 
provide an important backdrop to the analysis of the policy-making process, also with 
35 
regard to regard to regional development initiatives, and we can now tum to matters of a 
more detailed nature. 
36 
2. Policy Matters 
Having delineated the basic features of the political and economic institutions relevant 
from a regional policy perspective, it is now time to narrow down the focus and take a 
closer look at the process of public policy-making. Obviously the preceding discussion 
of political institutions has established the foundation on which this section will elaborate, 
but as policy analysis has become a major field of study in its own right, an examination 
of existing approaches will provide the next step on the road towards an analytical 
framework for empirical studies of the politics of regional economic intervention. 
The study of individual areas of government activity became a major area of 
academic activity in the 1960s in the wake of the expansion of the welfare states and their 
vast array of social and economic policies. Historically the origins of this scholarly 
activity would seem to owe much to the perceived failure of many of these initiatives, 
despite what appeared to be the best intentions of their political sponsors,105 and these 
circumstances have certainly influenced the nature and direction of policy analysis as a 
field of academic study. On the one hand the initial focus was very much on what was 
seen as the weaknesses of the present workings of the policy-making process, and this 
may explain why much work entailed more or less explicit notions about how the ideal 
process should be. On the other hand many studies were evaluations of particular policy 
programmes undertaken for government bodies, and hence the practical and conceptual 
distinction between academic studies, consultancy work, and advocacy of particular 
policies or organizational arrangements became unclear. 106 Add to this the processual and 
relational nature of the object of study, involving a complex web of activities involved 
related to defining and enforcing collectively binding decisions in which a wide range of 
actors inside and outside the state take part, and the reasons why it has been difficult to 
delimit policy analysis as a distinct discipline would appear to be obvious. 
The lack of well-defmed external boundaries would, however, also seem to 
underline the necessity of reviewing major positions within policy analysis in order to 
identify an approach that is both compatible with the overall institutionalist framework 
105 Ham & Hill 1984 ch. I: Hagwood & Gunn 1986 pp 32ff, I 96ff; Mayntz 1993 pp 12ff, Alb:ek 1993. 
106 On the conceptual level this resulled in attempts to distinguish between policy studies, i.e. knowledge 
0/ po~cy processes and areas, and policy analysis concerning itself with applying knowledge in specific 
policy processes (Hogwood & Gunn 1986 pp 26-31) . This text follows Ham & Hill (1984 p 4) in using 
what has become widely recognized as the catch-all term, policy analysis, for both activities. It goes 
without saying that the following is written fmnIy within the analysis-o/ tradition, although it has 
benefitted from writings from the more applied tradition - Hogwood & Gunn - and the ensuing analysis 
of regional policy may eventually prove to be valuable from policy-maker perspective too. 
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011£1 geared to a level of empirical detail adequate from the perspecti ve of the study of the 
politics of regional policy. The discussion proceeds in three stages : first the strength and 
weaknesses of the dominant top-down approach is examined, then major bOllom-up 
alternatives are reviewed, and finally a modified framework adopted for the purposes of 
this project is outlined. 
Perfect Administration and the Top-down Paradigm 
The two basic assumptions in the top-down paradigm are that 1) the starting point of the 
policy-making process is the political decision to take public action in a particular matter, 
and consequently that 2) policy-making should be analyzed as the process through which 
political decisions are transformed into actions by state bodies. On the basis of this the 
policy process can be divided into a number of stages, as illustrated by Figure 5, and the 
most important function of policy analysts is to point out what possible distortions may 
occur at various points. The search for what Christopher Hood has called 'perfect 
administration'to7 has lead to the identification of a number of key conditions that should 
be fulfilled in order to ensure the flawless transformation of political decisions into public 
action: 108 
- clear objectives, unambiguously defmed and 
based on a valid theory of causes and effects, 
- policy insulation, i.e. absence of external 
circumstances, political or otherwise, that may 
undermine or counteract particular measures, 
- political control with implementation, implying 
complete understanding and cooperation by all 
public bodies and staff involved, and 
- adequate policy design, i.e. policy instruments 
capable of ensuring the compliance of the actors 
Policy 
formulation 
Policy 
design 
Imple-
mentation 
Policy 
evaluation 
• agenda setting 
• issue filtration 
• issue definition 
• forecasting 
• selling objectives 
• options analysis 
* resources 
• application 
• effects 
• perfonnance review 
• policy changes 
targeted by a particular policy, and allocation of Figur 5. Phases of the policy 
the necessary fmancial and organizational process. Source: Hagwood & Gunn 
resources. 1984 p 24, Winter 1994 pp 15ff. and 
Sabatier 1993 pp 267ff 
Obviously such stringent demands are rarely, if ever, met in the real world. A precise 
107 Ham & Hill 1984 pp 97ff, Hagwood & Gunn pp 207ff. 
108 Rcfonnulated on the basis of Hagwood & Gunn (1986 pp 207m, Ham & Hill ( 1984 pp 981) and 
Sabatier (1993 pp 267m. 
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definition of objectives is not only hampered by the transaction costs involved in 
specifying causal relationships in complex situations, but also by the political nature of 
such objectives: vague or symbolic statements of intent may be deliberately designed to 
cultivate political constituencies. 109 Insulation of the policy process may run counter to the 
need to generate political support or acquire information from the parties involved, and 
achieving it can be complicated by the existence of parallel policy programmes affecting 
the same sets of problems. 11 0 Central political control is limited by the very real possibility 
of public organizations or their employees pursuing different goals, III and fmancial, 
organizational and political reasons may undermine effectiveness by restricting the 
resources available or ruling out policy instruments perceived to be unduly coercive. lI2 
Many of these valuable points have indeed been developed within the top-down 
tradition, but the approach also entails problems of a more fundamental nature. Firstly, 
the perception of the policy process as a rationalist search for the most effective means 
to address particular problems has been criticized along severallines:l13 some have argued 
that policy-makers tend to react to the political articulation of problems rather than the 
problems themselves,I J4 while others have stressed that most 'new' policies are 
incrementalist modifications of existing ones. III Secondly, the instrumentalist notion of 
policy instruments as neutral vehicles for political objectives would also seem to be 
questionable: different organizational delivery arrangements and policy instruments may 
entail different incentives structures and relations of power,"6 and hence it is hardly 
surprising that the question of means is often as politically sensitive as the overall 
objectives. Thirdly, the demand for policy insulation as a condition for 'perfect 
administration' would seem to collide with a central feature of the institutionalist 
approach, namely the social embeddedness of political processes that sees political 
initiatives from outside the state itself as an intrinsic feature and makes the sustaining 
overall legitimacy of the state a purpose in its own right. 
All in all this suggests that although the top-down approach has certainly highlighted 
109 Hogwood & Gunn 1986 pp 150-59, Jessop 1990 pp 156, cf the discussion above. 
110 Sabatier 1993 pp 278ff, Hogwood & Gunn pp 222-28. 
111 This is the classical bottom-up criticism of 'perfect administration', but, ironically, also a major 
preoccupation of the top-down tradition (e.g. Hogwood & Gunn 1986 pp 198-206). 
112 Hogwood & Gunn 1986 pp 169f, cf the discussion in the following section. 
113 Lane 1995 pp 77ff, Hogwood & Gunn 1986 pp 53ff 
114 Hogwood & Gunn 198, cf Jessop 1990 p 156. 
115 The incrementalist perspective is often associated with the work of Charles Lindblom, cf Ham & Hill 
1984 ch. 5, Lane 1995 pp 75-79. 
116 Cf the discussion in the following section. 
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a number of important specific features of the policy process, some of its underlying 
premises are less plausible and could easily restrict the analytical view by focusing on 
some aspects and relegating others to the status of negative impediments to the coveted 
'perfect administration'. 
Boltom-up Approaches /0 Policy Analysis 
Given the single-mindedness of the top-down approach it is hardly surprising that a 
number of alternative approaches to have emerged over the years, and that these have 
taken some of the critical points made above as their point of departure. While some have 
worked from the assumption of the impossibility of central political control with 
implementation, others have insisted on the importance of external actors and their 
relationship with the implementing public body. 
One bottom-up trend in policy analysis has claimed that the basic problem of the 
top-down tradition was that it made political decisions the prerogative of politicians and 
top-level administrators and thereby denied the political nature of the decisionary 
discretion of front-line staff interacting directly with private actors. 1l1 As many public 
policies can neither be described nor controlled in minute detail, front-line personnel will 
have a measure of freedom to go about things in different ways, and as this will alter the 
way a target group is affected by public policy, the discretion exercised by "the street-
level bureaucracy"'" is in effect micro-level political decision-making that modifies 'the 
rules of the game' and/or the distribution of resources. 119 Front-line discretion is an 
inevitable part of the implementation process when this presupposes extensive interaction 
with private actors, not only in the provision of services such as education or health care, 
but also when it is necessary to obtain detailed information in order to establish whether 
a finn fulfills complex eligibility criteria for fmancial support. 120 Instead of seeing street-
level discretion as an obstacle to the realization of political objectives defined from above, 
policy objectives are in a sense shaped or at least modified in the interaction between 
front-line staff and private actors, and thus the methodological implications is that instead 
of moving top-down to register the gradual perversion of political objectives through 
117 The classical works are Elmore 1979 and Lipsky 1980. For critical introductions to the this type of 
bottom-up analysis, see Ham & Hill 1984 pp 136-42 and Winter 1994 pp 78-86. 
118 The title of Lips~'Y 1980. 
I 19 This phenomenon can be seen in the development of individual strategies to cope with the day-to-day 
pressures of work - an overload of cases could result in routinization or informal rationing of services -
and when front-line professional staff collectively impose their own informal nonns on particular parts 
of the public sector (see e.g. Ham 1993). 
120 Cf the discussion of modes of implementation in Hallcier 1996. 
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imperfect administration, policy goals should imputed in a bottom-up movement known 
as "backward mapping". 121 
Perhaps the most radical bottom-up approach has been put forward by Benny Hjem 
and his collaborators, arguing that concentration on just one policy programme, whether 
from above or below, entails the risk of exaggerating its impact on private actors.122 
Instead policy research should take its point of departure in 'implementation structures', 
I.e. 
subsets of members within organizations which view a programme as their primary (or an 
instrumentally important) interest For these actors an implementation structure is as much 
an administrative structure through which purposive actions are taken as the organizations 
in which they are employed. 123 
Again the bottom-up nature of the approach is evident, but now both public and private 
actors are included in the analysis, and the possibility of viewing a partiCUlar policy 
measure from the perspective of the target group and its interaction with front-line 
bureaucrats has been fmnly established. 
Even this brief outline of two of the major bottom-up approaches suggests that 
compared to the dominant top-down paradigm they should be able to make a distinct 
contribution to the analysis of the policy process. The role of private actors and their 
informal links with implementing public bodies are highlighted, and attempts are made 
to provide rational explanations for actor behaviour at the bottom of the implementation 
chain that from a top-down perspective has been seen as distortions. At the same time it 
would, however, also seem to be the case that work undertaken along these lines 
may underestimate the Centre's indirect influence ... through its ability to affect the 
institutional structure in which individuals operate. 124 
Considerations of this sort has certainly been part of the design phase of the policy 
process, and thus the one-sided focus on micro-level studies of the goals and strategies of 
actors in effect takes the bottom-up close to being an inverted version of the much-
maligned dominant paradigm. 
121 The title of Elmore 1979. 
122 See e.g. Hjem & Hull 1987. and Hjem & Porter 1993. For a critical introduction. see Sabatier 1993 pp 
276-80. 
123 Hjem & Porter 1993 p 253 (italics original). 
124 Sabatier 1993 p 279 (italics original). 
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An Instillltionalist Approach tv I'ol/cy Ana(rsis 
Although both the existing traditions within policy analysis each in their own way are 
capable of making important contributions, it is also evident that none of them offers a 
comprehensive analytical framework. While the top-down approach tends to focus on 
processes internal to the state apparatus, the bottom-up alternative would seem to concern 
itself mainly with the implementation stage of the policy process and underplay the role 
of the constraints imposed in the policy formulation and design phases. While these 
limitations may be acceptable for some research purposes, they would certainly seem to 
be too narrow from the perspective of a study of the politics of regional policy where both 
the influence of the political environment, choices with regard to the design of individual 
policy programmes, and the relationship between the implementing body and private 
economic actors should be fIrmly within the analytical horizon. The scope for combining 
elements from the two traditions has, however, been demonstrated by amongst others Ham 
& Hill, Sabatier and Winter, and inspired by these contributions it should therefore be 
possible to develop a more comprehensive approach to the analysis of public policy. 
From an institutionalist perspective, the general starting point for an empirical 
analysis of a policy process must be the interaction between the public and private 
organizations involved. As illustrated by Figure 6, these can be distributed into three 
groups with each their relationship to the policy process: 
- the p olicy-making organization, i.e. the public body (or bodies) formally responsible 
for formulating and designing policies, including both elected politicians and the 
administrative machinery, 
- the political enVironment, comprising external organizations that may provide input 
into the process and thereby influence the nature of policy initiatives, and 
- targeted private actors, i.e. the organizations or individuals whose behaviour and 
strategies a policy is designed to influence by changing incentives in their 
environment. 
Before going on to more specifIc comments, some general points about the model's 
position vis-a-vis other related bodies ofJiterature should be made. Firstly, an institutional 
perspective would seem to able to incorporate the strengths and interests of both the top 
down and bottom-up approaches by covering both internal and external influences in the 
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Figur 6. Organizations and the policy process - An institutionalist model. 
policy-making process. m Secondly, the model includes both institutionaVorganizational 
and strategic dimensions of the policy process and should therefore be compatible with 
the general institutionalist framework and a strategic-relational perspective on politics. 
Andfinally the level of theoretical ambition is well reflected in the warning by Ham & 
Hill that 
it is hard to go beyond the identification of the key elements which must be analysed in the 
study of implementation, and the recognition of the overwhelming importance of the 
negotiation and bargaining which occur throughout the policy process. 126 
What is being proposed is in other words a "useful heuristic map"l27 rather than a theory 
implying hypotheses about the specific nature of the relationship between different 
elements within the process . 
Turning now to the key features of the model, it will be noted that it comprises two 
tiers: on the one hand the processes within the political sphere and its interaction with 
targeted private actors , and on the other hand the perceived problems and the eventual 
outcome of government intervention. The purpose of this is to emphasize that public 
policy is not just about symbolic gestures or abstract balances of power between 
organizations, but also somehow related to 'real problems in the real world', albeit in a 
rather tenuous way. Both policy formulation, determining the overall objectives, and 
policy design, the specific measures put in place to address a particular problem, are 
limited by the general conditions of incomplete information and transaction costs and 
influenced by the political, organizational and discoursive setting in which it takes places. 
125 The graphical representation does , however, probably come closer to a revised top-down model like the 
synthesis proposed by Winter (1994 pp S8m, but the figure also draws upon Ham & Hill (1984), 
Hagwood & Gunn ( 1986). Sabatier (1993), and Jenkins ( 1993). 
126 Ham & Hill 1984 P 112 (italics original). 
127 Jenkins 1993 p 42 . 
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And while policy-makers may be able to control policy output - money, staff or other 
resources committed to a particuJar purpose - the ultimate outcome of public intervention 
also depends on the response from the private actors targeted. 128 Nonetheless it must still 
be emphasized that the freedom of manoeuvre of a policy-making organization is also 
limited by the nature of the social relationships and material conditions that predominates 
in a particular field of policy - what sometimes have been called the 'problem 10gic'.'29 
Many things may go when it comes to policy-making - but not anything. 
By stressing the importance of the interaction of the policy-making organization with 
its political environment and the private actors targeted., the model reflects the social 
embeddedness of the policy-making process. It should., however, also be noted that no 
attempt is being made to specify the nature of these relationships by the introduction of 
e.g. a network perspective, but that the influence of particular actors must be established 
through concrete analysis of the resources at their disposal and the strategies employed. 
Policy-making organizations may find themselves more or less insulated from the 
pressures of organized interests, their relationship to the democratic legitimacy of party 
politics may be more or less distant, they mayor may not frod the dominant discourses 
conducive for their own agenda, they mayor may not have access to the resources needed 
to influence the behaviour of the private actors targeted, and they may employ these 
resources in more or less effectively from a particular strategic perspective. In short, at the 
heart of the politics of policy-making we frod relations of power. 
The design of a particular public initiative is an aspect of policy-making that, due 
to its inevitably somewhat technical nature, has often been seen as a matter for detailed 
empirical studies rather than general theoretical consideration. I shall, however, argue that 
for a number of reasons policy design is significant also for the analysis of what has 
traditionally been seen as 'big' issues, e.g. the political aspects of the policy process . Of 
course the actual design may diverge from the officially stated objectives, if for instance 
the underlying agenda of the initiative has been to make a symbolic gesture rather than 
address a problem in an effective marmer. But from a theoretical perspective the most 
important argument is that a policy design shapes the distinct set of incentives involved 
in a particular policy programme through features like the type of policy instrument 
chosen, the mode in which it is employed, the alterations aimed for in the behaviour of 
the target group, and the organizational set-up through which policy is to be implemented. 
Of course the response of private actors may also, as suggested by the bottom-up tradition, 
128 Hogwood & Gwm 1986 ch . 2. 
129 Anderson (1992 pp SSm contrasts 'political logic' and 'problem logic' in his comparative study of 
responses to regional economic crisis in Germany and the UK. 
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be influenced by the way in which front-line staff execute the tasks assigned to them, or 
indeed by their interpretation of the ideological context to which a particular initiative 
claims, or can be claimed, to belong. But as the policy design provides the material basis 
for the interaction between public and private actors, analyzing the design of a policy 
programme must be a prerequisite to understanding the relations of power involved in 
policy implementation. 
Underlying this line of reasoning is the assumption that the actors targeted by public 
policies are not passive victims of political and bureaucratic machinations, but must be 
seen as actors pursuing their own interests through strategic application of resources . This 
is true not only in the early phases where private actors through collective organizations 
and other means may influence policy formulation and design, but also applies in the 
subsequent implementation stage. When government policy changes their environment by 
introducing new rules and incentives into the game, the strategies of private actors are of 
course likely to be affected, but although the balance of resources between the state and 
the vast majority of individual private actors is heavily skewed towards the former, there 
are in many cases several options available to individual actors, in addition to the ever 
present ultimate alternative strategy of avoidance or non-compliance. (30 Public policies 
should in other words be seen as influencing rather than determining the behaviour of 
private actors, and again the question of power is essential for the understanding of the 
policy process . 
All in all the introduction of an institutionalist perspective would seem to be able to 
produce a methodological foundation that will allow empirical analyses to reflect the often 
contradictory character of the policy process - and still be able to integrate insights from 
a wide variety of traditions in the study of politics and policy. IJl The synthesis is 
compatible with the conception of political (and economic) organizations (and 
institutions) and their complex interactions developed in the preceding chapter, and draws 
upon the diverging traditions within policy analysis. The resulting analytical perspective 
does not entail a more or less smooth unidirectional movement from goals to 
implementation or vice versa, but instead offers an approach to policy analysis in which 
public and private actors in different institutional positions interact on the basis of an 
unequal distribution of resources. It will undoubtedly generate less tidy analyses to see 
public policy as a political attempt to bring about changes in the behaviour of private 
actors by instituting new sets of incentives and thereby transform the rules of the social 
130 ([the discussion of power and policy instruments in the following section. 
13 I The development of an analytical framework for the study of regional policy draws upon a ",ide fange 
of specialist traditions. cf Halkier 1992 and 1996. 
45 
game. But the approach will, however, hopefully also prove to be empirically fiuitful on 
the basis of its systematic attempt to link institutional and strategic aspects through-out 
the policy process, from the 'high grounds' of discourse and party politics via the 
'technicalities' of policy formulation and design toward the interaction of front-line 
bureaucracy with private actors . 
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3. Power and Policy Instruments 
The expansion of state intervention in the postwar period has not only been controversial 
in terms of the extent to which it was desirable or necessary, but also very much with 
regard to what methods public bodies should employ in order to achieve political goals. 
";ritain in the 1980s provided a, perhaps extreme, example of this when the Conservative 
~atcher government pursued a state project that in addition to rhetoric about 'rolling back 
the frontiers of the state' also involved a distinct preference for marketed-oriented policy 
instruments in the residual parts of the public sector. In this period UK regional policy 
moved away from its previous reliance on regulation and 'hard' resources like financial 
subsidies and infrastructure provision and instead enthusiastically embraced a 'softer' 
approach based on a plethora of public and semi-public advisory services. Allegedly the 
implication of this was that the capacity of the state to influence the actions of private 
firms was greatly diminished : regional policy was not just "at the crossroads",132 but a 
"retreat from policy"'3) had virtually brought it to "the end of the line".IJ' 
The political prominence of the nature of state intervention has been reflected in 
political science, but like policy analysis in general, the study of policy instruments has 
only recently become a growth industry, IJl and thus it displays all the disorganized charms 
of an academic Klondyke. Instead of SUbjecting the existing literature to a systematic 
head-on make-my-day style criticism, the text will build on central institutionalist 
propositions by analyzing policy instruments from the perspective of power. If the raison 
d'elre of public policy is to influence the actions of private actors in order to achieve 
political objectives. then a crucial element of its implementation must be a relation of 
power, and here the policy instruments employed could have material, as well as 
symbolic, importance for the public and private parties involved. Different instruments 
require distinct inputs on part of the state and establish different incentive structures for 
the private actors targeted, and thus the choice of instrument is likely to affect the extent 
to which the eventual policy outcome political resembles the objectives of the policy 
programme. The text will therefore take as its point of departure a general discussion of 
the concept of power, proceed to discuss existing typologies of policy instruments, and 
finally on the basis of this propose an alternative institutionalist approach. 
132 Albrechts el at. (eds) 1989. 
133 Harris 1993 . 
134 Cameron 1985 . 
135 Winter 1994 pp 36f 
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Power: ImlilUlionalisl Dimensions 
Given the centrality of the concept of power as "one of the building blocks"')6 of social 
science in general and politics in particular, the existence of an extensive and diverse 
literature could be anticipated,137 and even a cursory visit to a university library will 
confirm such expectations.138 It is not the intention to provide an in-depth review of the 
various positions in the theoretical debate about power, but rather to reach a definition 
compatible with an institutionalist perspective while avoiding the most obvious 
weaknesses of the dominant traditions. The contributions from self-proclaimed 
institutionalists are, however, relatively limited, 139 and hence a shortcut is taken by turning 
to a contribution from a parallel tradition, '''' namely the work of Anthony Giddens. 
The debate about the concept of power has been polarized between two distinct 
perspectives that could be called 'power over' and 'power to'. Contributions in the power-
over tradition - e.g. Weber, Lukes and Habermas - construe power as something imposing 
limits and constraints upon private actors, a resource in its own right vested in political 
authorities, inherently in conflict with the autonomy of individuals and thus equated with 
state domination of citizens. Contrary to this, authors in the power-to tradition - e.g. 
Easton, Foucault and Wrong - see power as a intrinsic potential in any individual, 
produced in specific relations by means of strategic mobilisation of particular resources. 14 ' 
Giddens traces this division back to the general polarization in the social sciences between 
structure- and agency-oriented approaches, "2 and from an institutionalist perspective its 
consequences are certainly rather unfortunate. The fundamental problem of the power-
over perspective is that it isolates power in political institutions and hence effectively 
marginalizes individual or collective actors from an almost OIWellian political scene. And 
while the power-to perspective makes up for this by establishing a close link between 
136 Hague et at. 1992 p 8. 
137 As noted by Hodgson (1989 pp 172ft). such expectations are not always fulfilled, cf the swprising 
paucity of attempts to define one of the key concepts in economics, the market. 
138 E,,1ensive surveys can be found in Wrong 1979 and Lukes (ed.) 1987: Kraft & Raben 1995 is brief and 
lucid. 
139 Power appears not to be a central concept in the work March & Olsen (Thomsen 1994 pp 16ft), and 
while the impact of institutions is of course crucial in the new institutional economics, power is 
effectively supplanted by other, parallel , concepts such as incentive structures. 
140 Like was the case when the strategic-relationists where drafted in to provide input with regard to political 
institutions, this is a pragmatic argument and does not in any way preclude that similar results could be 
reached by expanding on contributions from one of the institutionalist traditions. 
141 Kraft & Raben 1995 pp 5-1 L 
142 Giddens 1979 pp 88ff 
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agency and relations of power, it is difficult to see how institutional effects - e.g. the 
'hidden hand' of the market - could be accounted for in these tenns because they are 
characterized by an absence of direct actor-to-actor relations. 
The alternative conception of power developed by Giddens links power to the effects 
of both agency and social institutions upon other social phenomena. In his structuration 
theory the tenn power is associated both with the transfonnative capacity of actors, i.e. 
the capability "to secure outcomes where the realisation of these outcomes depends upon 
the agency of others", 1<.' and with structural domination, i.e. "reproduced relations of 
autonomy and dependence in social interaction". 144 While this may at first appear to be 
merely a restatement of the traditional dualism, the role of resources in both types of 
power ensures a coherent perspective because, in the words of Giddens, resources are the 
media through which actors exercise power, and "structures of domination involve 
asymmetries of resources employed in the sustaining of power relations."145 Taking 
Giddens' fonnulations as the main source of inspiration, it should be possible to fonnulate 
a parallel position in an institutionalist idiom.l46 In this text power will be defined as 
the capacity to produce effects upon a social actor, through either strategic employment of 
resources and/or institutionalized asymmetries in rules and distribution of resources. 
Before putting this definition into perspective by comparing it briefly to existing positions 
in the theoretical debate, the following three points should be noted. Firstly, the desire to 
produce a comprehensive concept that highlights the shared feature - production of effects 
via incentive structures - has resulted in the somewhat clumsy and/or construction. This 
has, however, been difficult to avoid if a single tenn should be able to include both 
- agency power, i.e. direct relations of power between actors positioned in and 
governed by the rules of a particular social institution, including deliberate attempts 
to modifY or eliminate such institutions, and 
- institUlional power, i.e . effects of social institutions upon the strategies or resources 
of actors that have not been brought about directly by any actor. 1.7 
143 Giddens 1979 p 93 . 
144 Giddens 1979 p 93 . 
145 Giddens 1979 p 93 (italics original). 
146 This should not just circumvent the idiolect associated with structuration theory, but also some of the 
claims entailed therein that one may not wish become associated with, cf the discussion about structures 
and actors above. 
147 This would also include the effects of institutional change brought about by 'internal trends' of 
development rather than the strategic behaviour of actors. 
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Se('ond~v, power is essentially a two-way relational phenomenon. 148 Although the balance 
of power is often heavily skewed., human actors without any resources whatsoever would 
appear to be a rare phenomenon,'49 and the co-existence of several social institutions 
creates the possibility for path-dependent actors to attempt a change of direction, however 
difficult and exceptional this may be in practice. 
Thirdly, the proposed definition of power is in line with central institutionalist tenets 
in that it establishes a close relationship between institutional and agency-oriented 
features through the insistence that institutions exercise power over actors and actors 
exercise power on the basis of institutionalized rules. 
Compared to other attempts to come to terms with power, the first thing that should 
be noted is that the proposed definition transgress the power-over/to polarization through 
the association of power with both actors and institutions, but still seems to have avoided 
central problems found in the two traditions. With regard to the power-to perspective the 
proposed definition clearly covers the two first of Steven Lukes' three dimensions of 
power, 150 namely those involving more or less overt conflicts between actors over issues 
or potential issues. Moreover, many of the delimitation problems faced by Dennis 
Wrong's classical power-to distinction between (intentional) power and (unintentional) 
influence would seem to be avoided simply by not making intention a necessary condition 
for exercise of power. 151 The consequence of this is, however, not only that a notion of 
institutional power is made possible, iS2 but also that side-effects, even unforseen ones, 
must be interpreted as relations of power. At first glance the proposed definition would 
seem to have a great deal in cornmon with formulations from the strategic-relational 
tradition where power has defined as "the production of effects within the limits set by 
148 Cf Giddens 1979 p 93. 
149 A starving hermit is a possible candidate; the cultural nonos governing parenthood ensures that a wean, 
or even an unborn child, can exercise power, albeit not necessarily intentionally. 
150 The classical work is Lukes 1974; for a critical perspective, see Ham & Hill 1984 ch. 4. 
151 It could perhaps be tempting to use the power/influence-pair as a more handy way of denoting 'actor 
power' and 'institutional power'. This would, however, entail the risk of engendering too many Wrong 
associations and underplay the close relationship between actors, institutions, and the two fonos of 
power 
152 It is interesting to note that despite Wrong's principled insistence on including intentionality as the 
criterion that distinguishes power from influence (1979 pp 31), his claim that 
organizations may be collective or corporate actors sui genens, wielding and accumulating power that 
serves neither the goals and interests of their members, nor of a minority of organizational leaders, 
nor. for that matter of outside individual or groups to which the leaders are accountable (1979 p 140) 
suggests that institutional power nonetheless is about to sneak in through the back door. 
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the 'structural constraints' confronting different agents". m Power would, however, still 
seem to be too closely associated with social actors like in the power-to tradition, and thus 
Jessop, perhaps in order to avoid a structuralist power-over perspective, in effects ends 
up resembling Wrong, albeit with an uneven playing field introduced. Compared to the 
power-over perspective, it should be stressed that unlike Lukes' notorious third dimension 
of power - the capability to neglect the 'real interests' of actors by influencing their 
perception of interest15' - the institutionalist perspective outlined above does not entail 
assumptions about the interests of any actor involved in a relation of power, institutional 
or otherwise . ' 5~ Instead a much more modest claim is made, namely that the presence of 
a particular social institution establishes a structure of incentives that make certain types 
of behaviour and strategies more likely than others. 
All in all the definition of power proposed would seem to be adequate at least from 
as theoretical perspective, and we can therefore now tum to the real plJJ1lose of the 
exercise, namely the role of power at the sharp end of the process of implementing public 
policies 
Approaches to the Study of Policy Instntmenls 
Within the small, but growing, literature on the means by which state bodies try to 
influence private actors it is possible to identifY at least four different approaches to the 
study of policy instruments. These could be dubbed maximalist, programmist, 
relationalist, and resource-oriented, and as the name-calling perhaps indicates, I shall 
argue that the rust three produce rather problematic typologies while the last one is able 
to provide important input to the development of an institutionalist perspective. 
A maxima/isl approach to policy instruments bases its typology on differences 
between major social institutions - e.g. bureaucracy or market - and can often be found 
in the political discourse surrounding the policy process,156 although is has also occurred 
in academic works. '57 The problem here is that such concepts only describe the 
153 Jessop 1982 p 253 (quoted by Thomsen 1991a p 66). 
154 As noted by Giddens in a highly enjoyable polemical comment (1979 pp 901), Lukes' third dimension 
is in fact not situated on the structural (institutional) level, but rather appears to be manipulative power-
to writ large (cf Wrong 1979 pp 28fl). 
155 The notion of objective (underlying, real) interests has long been a contentious part of the marxist 
tradition, and has recently been challenged vigorously by post-marxist discourse analysts (e.g. Emesto 
Laciau and Chantal MoufTe) and strategic relationists (e.g. Thomsen 1991 b pp I 84fl). 
156 See Hallder 1992 or 1996 ",ith regard to regional policy. 
157 In the somewhat uneven typology of Winter (1994 pp 36fl), 'competition' is placed alongside 'regulation', 
'information' and 'subsidies'. although the former describes the desired end state of relationships between 
(continued .. ) 
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organizalional conlexi in which a policy programme operates but do not clarifY the 
precise nature of the interaction between public and private actors. For example, the 
introduction of 'market mechanisms' in the delivery of public services may bring about a 
move from public monopoly to heavily regulated competition between a number of private 
providers, but despite the liberal rhetoric about the virtues of competition the 
consequences of such a move for the delivery of these services to private clients remains 
uncertain.ll• Applying a maximalist approach may at best presents an incomplete picture 
of the difference between policy instruments by, at worst conflates two different levels 
of theoretical enquiry. 
A programmisl approach would certainly not seem to have a problem of too 
comprehensive analytical categories, as will be evident from the following discussion of 
the typology of Linder & Peters. They start out from the contention that 
so much of what constitutes the reality of policy is socially and politically defined and can 
easily confound the objective categories imposed by an outside investigator IS? 
Their analysis therefore sets out to search for "the cognitive factors that shape instrument 
choice and appraisal" by interviewing decision-makers, and then "attempts to place those 
SUbjective factors into their proper institutional and systemic context". 160 This results in 
I) seven classes of instruments (direct provision, subsidy, tax, contract, authority, 
regulation, and exhortation), 2) eight 'design criteria', ranging from complexity and 
visibility to precision of targeting and chances of failure, and 3) an 'ecology of contexts' 
that highlights features of both the organizational setting and discoursive environment, 
including the perceived coerciveness of various instruments. 161 The authors point out that 
their "tentative enumeration" of instruments is neither necessarily "exhaustive nor 
mutually exclusive", and as the dividing line between subsidies/contracts and 
regUlation/authority is more than a little unclear,162 it is difficult to disagree with them. 
157 ( ... continued) 
private actors rather than the nature of the public intervention itself The use of the term 'competition' 
in connection Wlth e.g. public tendering could of course be interpreted as a result of progranunism, but 
\\hen the same typology uses the term 'bureaucracy' for public provision in general, maximalism is the 
most reasonable depiction of this inconsistency. 
158 See Lane 1995 pp 135-60. 
159 Linder & Peters 1989 p 36 
160 Linder & Peters 1989 p 36. 
161 Linder & Peters 1989 pp 44ff, 48ff, 54. 
162 Some subsidies are clearly contracts - the state may for example pay a private actor on the condition that 
he undertakes a specific investment - and some contracts involve a more or less open subsidy, as seen 
(continued .. . ) 
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This may not be a matter of great concern as long as the ultimate aim of the exercise is 
confined to mapping policy-maker discourse, but if one is interested in exploring the 
material aspects of the interaction between public and private organizations, a 
categorization of policy instruments based upon a somewhat arbitrary, or perhaps 
defiantly unsystematic, aggregation of policy programmes would certainly not appear to 
be the way forward. From such a perspective the two most valuable contributions of 
Linder & Peters are their insistence on the different ways in which the same policy 
instrument can be employed and the centrality of the question of power. 
In many ways a relalionisl approach is more ambitious than the three other because 
its central aim is to develop a typology that specifies the relationship between different 
elements of the policy process. Instead of treating dimensions as independent variables 
in an analytical framework, the purpose is to develop hypotheses about the relationship 
between the various dimensions, i. e. ultimately a set of co-variables. The work of 
Theodore Lowi is a prominent example of an relationist approach, and his " four arenas 
of power" are based on the assumption that 
policies determine politics . ... Different ways of coercing provide a set of parameters, a 
context, within which politics take place. 163 
The theoretical analysis takes its point of departure in two aspects of public coercion 
towards private actors. 164 One the one hand the likelihood of coercion varies: it is limited 
Applicability of coercion 
individual conduct environment 
Likelihood remote distributive policy constituent policy party interest 
of coercion 
immediate regulative policy redistributive policy group bargaining 
decentralized centralized 
local interest cosmopolitan 
ideology 
Figur 7. Lowi's four systems of policy. Source: Lowi 1972 p 300. 
162 ( .. continued) 
in e.g. defence procurement. 
163 Low; 1972 p 299 (italics original). 
164 The classical statement is Lawi 1972, but earlier versions appear to include many of the same elements 
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in the case of subsidies or public services, but has a much more immediate presence in 
e.g. regulation of product standards or state control of private lending. On the other hand 
coercion may also be applied either directly to influence the conduct of individuals, or 
indirectly by changing their environment. By combining these two policy dimensions 
Lowi arrives at four types of policy that each have their distinct political implications in 
terms of where and how political conflicts are likely to unfold, as illustrated by Figure 7. 
It has been claimed that this approach has "more admirers than followers"'6l because 
of the difficulties in connecting different areas of public policy with the four central 
categories . A leading 'follower' has tried to address this problem by introducing 
"intermediate categories",I60 but as this is undertaken on the basis of oblique and erratic 
criteria, the empirical credibility of the arenas has only been enhanced by weakening their 
theoretical foundation. '67 Moreover, from a theoretical perspective doubts must also 
remain about other aspects of Lowi's approach. Firstly, the insistence, like in the work of 
Linder & Peters, on basing the analysis exclusively on the perceptions of policy-makers 
of the coerciveness of policy instruments excludes the potential tension between political 
perceptions of policy instruments and their actual degree of coerciveness from the 
analysis. '68 Secondly, the unidirectional nature of the causal relationship in Lowi's scheme 
is questionable: it is after all not impossible to imagine that co-variance between forms 
of political interaction and more or less coercive types of public policy could be the result 
of the choices and preferences of particular political organizations. All in all the most 
important contribution of Lowi's relationist approach would seem to have been to put the 
coercive nature of policy instruments, i.e. public exercise of power in relation to private 
actors, fumly on the agenda. 
The so-called 'tools approach' of Lester M. Salamon combines elements from both 
the relationist and programmist approaches. His central premise has more than a faint 
echo of relationism: 
each instrument canies with it a substantial amount of 'bagage' in the form of its own 
characteristic implementing institutions, standard operating procedures, ... , products, degree 
164 ( .. continued) 
(see e.g. Salisbury 1968, Froman 1968, Richardson et 01. 1982 pp 3fT, and WindhofT-Heritier 1987 pp 
23fT) 
165 Richardson et al. 1982 p 4. 
166 Spitzer 1983 ch . 2 
167 The reason for this could be that Spitzer subdivides each of the four resulting arenas (1983 pp 29fT) 
rather than the two dimensions upon the basis of which the arenas were based. 
168 WindhofT-Heritier 1987 p 25 
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of visibility, " and relationship with other social forces'·' 
And like the programmists, Salamon 
employs two conceptual tiers, namely 
a number of tools - direct government, 
grants, loan guarantees, tax 
expenditure, social regulation and 
government corporation - and a 
number of dimensions along which 
these tools can be analyzed, cf the 
adjoining Figure 8. Again the choice of 
tools would seem to reflect an 
DIMENSION 
Nature 
Delivery system 
Centralization 
Automaticity 
VARIABLES 
• money payments 
• provision of goods/services 
• legal protections 
• restrictions/penalties 
• direct 
• indirect 
degree of central decision-making 
degree of routine/non-discretion 
occupation with particular policy Figur 8. Salamon's dimensions of government 
programmes and the political situation tools. Source: Salamon & Lund 1989 pp 34-39. 
in the US in the 1980s,'70 but compared 
to Linder & Peters, the dimensions are given a much more prominent place in the 
programmatic statements. 171 Furthermore, the stated intention to establish relationist links 
between the various elements of the typology would in practice seem to have been largely 
forgotten in the theoretical elaborations, and thus the dimensional part of Salamon's 
approach clearly has a potential for providing input to the development of an 
institutionalist alternative. 
The final approach to the study of policy instruments to be reviewed is the resource-
based typology proposed by Christopher Hood in a slim volume entitled The Tools of 
Government.172 As illustrated by Figure 9, government activities are here analyzed 
according to the four basic resources at the disposal of a state - nodality, treasure, 
authority and organization - and this produces two types of results . First and foremost a 
detailed analysis of a long list of tools at the disposal of government is undertaken by 
combining the four resources and their inherent limitations with their 'level of application': 
the general public, Of particular groups or individuals. But at the same time more general 
169 Salamon 1981 p 264. 
170 The tools approach was originally developed as part of an analysis of 'third-party government', i.e. forms 
of public intervention in which e.g. hospitals, private firms, or non-federal public authorities play an 
important part (Salamon 1981 ). and was later employed on a greater scale to put the privatization 
policies of the Reagan government into perspective (Salamon & Lund (eds.) 1989). 
171 Unfortunately the use of the tools approach in a range of policy areas (Salamon & Lund (cds.) 1989) is 
so inconsistent that any conclusions about the empirical applicability would be premature; sometbing 
that would seem to be implicitly acknowledged by Salamon in his concluding chapter (1989). 
172 Hood 1983. 
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RESOURCE ACfIVITY COINAGE LIMITATION 
Nodality communication messages credibility 
Treasure exchange moneys fungibility (free exchange) 
Authority detennine tokens of authority standing (legal) 
Organization act directly treatments capacity (physical) 
Figur 9. Hood's four basic resources of government. Source: Hood 1983 pp 3/ 
conclusions are also reached through a discussion of the consequences for public and 
private actors of employing particular resources. Hood distinguishes between the economy 
of intervention from the perspective of the state, i.e whether a type of resource is 
automatically depleted by deployment or not, and the'economy' of intervention from the 
perspective of private actors, i.e the degree of external constraint involved. This results 
in the cross-tabulation that can seen in Figure 10; and leads to the conclusion that 
'economizing' with government intervention involves complicated trade-offs, especially 
if economy of constraint is interpreted in the wider sense of hitting only the relevant 
private actors, using the minimum force required, and still intervening in a way that 
ensures that the desired change of behaviour will occur.173 
A noticeable advantage of a 
resource-based approach is that its 
primary typology conceptualizes a 
central aspect of the direct interaction 
between the state and private actors. 
Hood is certainly not the only writer for 
CON-
STRAINT 
low 
high 
DEPLET ABILITY 
contingent immanent 
nodality treasure 
authority organization 
whom the nature of the resources Figur to. Hood's constraint and depletability of 
employed by government is an important government resources. Source: Hood 1983 p 
variable, but his typology still appears to f./5. 
be the one in which resources are applied as criteria for categorization in the most 
consistent manner. 17' The attention given to the importance of the more or less selective 
173 Hood uses the concepts directness (hitting the target and no-one else), scalability (avoiding draconian 
overkill), and non-substitutability (limit possibility of avoidance or deflection of effects (1983 pp 14511). 
The book in general, and this section in particular, clearly demonstrates that the grand old man of the 
"perfect administration" tradition is keenly aware of the obstacles to anything akin to the realization of 
this ideal-type model of the policy process. 
174 As can be seen from Figure 8, Sa/amon's tools approach subdivides authority by introducing additional 
criteria concerning the way in which this resource is employed, and combines nodality with organization 
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targeting of government intervention would also seem to be well-worth bringing fOIWard, 
as is the insistence on the varying depletability of various types of resources. The major 
weakness of Hood's approach can be said to be the introduction of a once-and-for-all 
hierarchy of the constraint on private actors involved in using the various types of 
resources as policy instruments l7l As constraint involves a relation of power, it is vital to 
take into account both the resources of the targeted actors and the way in which 
government itself employs the resources at its disposal, and thus maintaining a fixed 
hierarchy of constraint would be highly misleading. This should, however, not prevent us 
from transposing the core ideas of the resource-oriented approach to an institutionalist 
framework, and this is the task to which we now can tum. 
Policy /nstrumenls - An Institutionalist Perspective 
By bringing together the concept of power and typologies of policy instruments discussed 
above, it should now be possible to develop an institutional approach to the interaction 
between public and private organizations in the implementation phase of the policy 
process . 
The whole point about public policy is to influence private actors so that their 
behaviour comply with public political objectives, and it is therefore reasonable to analyse 
the interaction between public and private actors as a relation of power. From this 
perspective policy instruments are the levers of power employed by public organizations 
to produce effects that will take the external world towards a politically defmed desirable 
state. As we have already defined (actor) power as strategic employment of resources, an 
analysis of policy instruments will have to take into account both the nature of the 
resources involved and the rules governing their use, and while some of the approaches 
discussed above actually do include elements from both these perspectives, \76 by far the 
most consistent attempt to integrate rules and resources into a unified framework can be 
174 ( .. continued) 
in a direct-provision category along the same lines. The use of such additional criteria can also be seen 
in the typology ofWindhotT-Heritier, cfthe discussion below. 
175 Again Hood is not alone in trying to establish such a hierarchy of constraint amongst policy instruments 
as Deem & Phidd arrange the instruments of governing, "albeit somewhat artificially, along a continuum 
starting with minor or almost non-existent coercion and extending to maximum coercion" (1983 pili J. 
This produces the following sequence (1983 pp III ff) : self-regulation, exhortation, expenditure, 
regulation (including taxation), and public ownership - and is open to the same criticism as Hood's less 
linear scheme. 
176 Hood and Salamon are the two most obvious examples. 
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Authority Legal and/or legitimate position to demand, forbid etc. 
Information Capacity to mobilize and process cognitive data 
Finance Stocks of moneys or other means of general exchange 
Organization The physical ability to act directly in a coordinated manner 
Figur 11. Policy resources. 
found in the work of Adrienne Windhoff-Heritier. In Insisting on the importance of both 
Steurnngsprinzipien and Beschaffenheit, she develops a two-dimensional perspective on 
policy instruments, and although the actual conceptualization is not beyond amendment, 173 
her example is certainly encouraging from an institutionalist perspective. 
Concerning resources, the systematic nature of Christopher Hood's typology has 
already been noted. Neither resource-based studies of power in general' 79 nor the work of 
Windhoff-Heritier' lIO would seem to offer a significantly better starting point, and thus this 
text will adopt a slightly modified version of the Hood scheme. As can be seen by 
comparing Figure 11 with Figure 9 above, two terms have been changed: information and 
finance have supplanted the more arcane expressions of nodality and treasure. More 
significantly, however, three of Hood's definitions have also been adjusted. Authority has 
lost its exclusively legal nature, thereby bringing it into line with the less formal 
177 WindhofT-Heritier 1987. 
178 Cf the discussion below. 
179 Wrong ( 1979 pp 125) considers the typologies of Amitai Etzioni and William Gamson two of the most 
influential attempts to develop a resource-based analysis of power. The former distinguishes between 
"coercive, utilitarian and nonnative assets, corresponding, respectively, to instruments of force, material 
rewards such as goods and services, and symbols of legitimacy. prestige or love", while Gamson 
differentiales between "constraint, inducement and persuasion resources" . Although essentially covering 
the same types of resources, Etzioni 's slightly difTerent grouping - Hood's treasure and nodality 
categories are collapsed into one - would not seem to be an advantage from a policy-instrument 
perspective. Similarly, while Gamson may belong to a tradition that sees organization not as a resource 
in its own right but as derived from the three others (cfHood 1983 p 72), its physical and collective 
nature would still seem to warrant a separate analytical category. Similar arguments also applies to 
Boulding's " three faces of power" (1989) in which resource- and rule-based criteria blend uneasily in his 
distinction between .. the stick" (the use of force) , " the deal", and " the kiss" (to create obligations) (see 
Hague el al. 1992 pp 10f). 
180 WindhofT-Heritier's Beschaffenheil typology distinguishes between the following categories of resources 
(1987 pp 35-41 ): material (fmancial. infrastructure and in-kind), services (communicative and physical), 
and regulation. Again the four Hoodian resources would seem be covered, but the rationale for the 
regrouping would seem to suggest a change of perspective from Hood's top-down approach to a more 
client-oriented perspective that would perhaps be more suitable in an avowedly bottom-up environment. 
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institutionalist approach to power and political institutions. lSI The collective nature of 
organization has been emphasized by stressing co-ordination in order to set it apart from 
the three other types of resources,''' and the organizational connotations of the term 
'nodality' have disappeared with the term itself183 
While society-wide authority is the type of resource that sets the state apart from all 
other organizations, and one that arguably functions as the ex- or implicit foundation for 
the use of the other three types of resources,''' it is difficult to envisage a modem state 
intervening solely by means of authority, simply because the transaction costs involved 
in devising and policing detailed rules about everything will be prohibitive. ISS At the same 
time it is also worth stressing that Figure 11 should not be construed as a fixed hierarchy 
of constraints because policy instruments are of a relational nature. Information, often 
decried as one of the least potent resources at the disposal of the state,l86 could for 
example bring about large-scale or in-depth change if applied in a strategic manner187 
because the effects of a particular policy instruments depends not only on the type of 
resource employed, but also on the position of the private actors targeted and on the way 
in which resources are employed. 1S8 
With regard to the latter I propose a two-tier analytical scheme, distinguishing 
between on the one hand the basic rules under which the interaction between public and 
private actors take place, and on the other hand the specific modes of this interaction. 
Turning first to the basic niles of interaction, the concepts summarized in Figure 12 can 
be said to be inspired by Windhoff-Heritier, although her contribution has been reworked 
and expanded upon. Alterations include adoption of concepts with a more, for want of a 
better word, legal ambience, a regrouping of concepts in order to remove subdivisions that 
18 I See Wrong 1979 ch. 3, cfthe discussion above. 
182 Cf the discussion of collective and individual resources in Wrong 1979 ch. 6. 
183 For Hood nodnlity "denotes the property of being in the middle of an infonnation or social network" 
( 1983 P 4) and thereby in fact introduces an additional organizational criteria in his otherwise resource-
oriented typology. 
184 Cf the discussion above of the state as a political institution. 
185 Hood's entertaining exploration of the difficulties faeed by an imaginary government wanting to promote 
vegetarianism provides an excellent illustration of this (1983 pp 149ft). 
186 See e.g. Doem & Phidd 1983 pilL 
187 An example of the fonner could be government safety drives in relation to the use fireworks . Examples 
of the latter could be government advisory services providing market intelligence for small firms in a 
particular industry. 
188 This argument does of course in no way preclude that certain resources are perceived to be more 
powerful than others within a particular political discourse, but this is a matter for historical analysis and 
does not affect the theoretical argument. 
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Violation Arbitrary infringement 
Regulation Rules governing behaviour 
Conditional Resources transferred if private actor agrees terms 
Unconditional Resources made freely available 
Figur 12. Rules of interaction. 
would appear to reflect resource- rather than rules-oriented criteria, 189 and inclusion of the 
violation category to cover instances in which the state actions transgresses its legal and/or 
legitimate remit. No particular category has been included to cover constitutional or 
organisational change l90 as this type of changes can be accounted for by combining 
regulatory rules and organizational resources. It must be emphasized that contrary to the 
resource perspective, there is clearly a 'hierarchy of constraint' in the basic rules governing 
the interaction between the state and private actors. Once regulations have been instituted 
they can effectively be imposed upon individual citizens and organizations, and attempts 
to avoid them will normally carry legal sanctions. In the case of a conditional relationship 
private actors can choose either to accept or decline the terms on offer, and although 
policy programmes may have been designed with a view to a balance of resource that 
should propel private actors to accept what could perhaps be seen as unfavourable terms, 
the option of avoiding commitment does not bring about any legal consequences 
whatsoever. In the case of unconditional forms of interaction, no strings are attached to 
the resources offered by the state to private actors, although the nature of these resources 
will of course often in practice limit their possible application and thereby stimulate 
particular patterns of behaviour. 
A particular policy programme may draw simultaneously on several rules of 
interaction and more than one type of resources, resulting in a massive number of 
189 Both of Windhoff-Heritier's concepts Angebot and UberzeugunglAujklarung refer to unconditional 
transfer of resources, and the distinction between them would seem to drawn on the basis of the resources 
involved (fmance/infrastructure versus information) rather than the rules governing their employment. 
Similar reasons appear to have prompted the distinction between UberzeugunglAujklar,mg and 
Steurung durch Vorbild wbere in the latter case the state promotes best-practice on the back of its O'>'TI 
activities (e.g. by taking the needs of wheelchair users into account in building design), because the only 
difference between the two is the role of organizational resources in the latter. 
190 Such categories can be found in the typologies of MacRae (1980) and Elmore (1987). 
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Authority Information Finance Organization 
Regulation safet}' standards primar)' education taxation policing 
Contractual permits further education industrial subsidies public transport 
Voluntary summer lime consumer advice social security roads 
Figur 13. Rules, resources and policy instruments - examples. 
potential combinations, 191 but even if we defme a policy instrument as a specific 
combination of one rule and one type of resource and disregard systematic violation, a 
simple cross-tabulation produces 12 possible generic instruments. In Figure 13 a range of 
arbitrary examples have been distributed according to the rules and resources on the basis 
of which they operate,l 92 and this exercise will hopefully demonstrate the relevance as 
well as the limitations in using the two dimensions as means of discriminating between 
public activities. The empirical relevance is suggested by the fact that 12 examples can 
be found without resorting to obscure state activities,193 and thus it would seem to be 
worth-while to try out this approach on a greater scale. At the same time it is, however, 
also evident that the scope for variation in these activities still is considerable. This can 
of course partly be traced back to differences in objectives, funding or organizational set-
up, but I shall argue that an additional, and often overlooked, source of diversity is the 
way in which identical policy instruments are being employed. 
Taking this into account requires the introduction of a third analytical dimension, or 
rather a set of dimensions, which could be termed modes ofimplementation l94 and covers 
specific designs with regard to rules and resources that could affect the degree to which 
public priorities will affect the behaviour of private actors. Obviously the existing 
literature, and indeed the discussion in the preceding pages, has pointed to a number of 
design features that could form part of a mode of implementation analysis,195 e.g. 
191 If any combination of rules can be used with any combination of resources, the precise figure is 225, 
although some of these remain speculative. 
192 For the sake of the argument, the classi fication of the various policy area has been undertaken with the 
classical Western European welfare state in mind. 
193 With the possible exception of the voluntary-authority example. 
194 One or more aspects of this third dimension can be found in a good number of works on policy analysis 
and instruments, but the author assumes full responsibility for grouping them together in what at the 
present stage might well be described as a residual dimensional with a vapid beading 
195 See e.g. Hood 1983, Salamon & Lund 1989, Linder & Peters 1989, and Halkier & Dans en 1995a and 
1995b. 
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- the selectiveness of targeting 
- the tailorized or standardized nature of the interaction 
- the programmatic or one-off nature of intervention 
- the proactive or reactive role of public organizations in individual cases 
- the degree of discretion vested in the front-line bureaucracy 
- the political visibility of particular measures 
On may speculate about the possibility of identifying a core of 'universal modes', but at 
least some of these features are likely to be closely linked to the characteristics of 
particular policy areas. As the idea of grouping these variables together has not been 
explored in a systematic manner before,l96 it would probably be better to undertake a first 
exploration in the context of a specific policy area rather than start out by pretending to 
provide an exhaustive encyclopedia of the modes of the world. A systematic discussion 
of modes of implementation will therefore not take place here, but instead form part of the 
general task of establishing an analytical framework for the study of the politics of 
regional policy. 197 Meanwhile, the points suggested above must serve as a sneak preview 
of what could be entailed in developing modes of implementation as an analytical 
category. 
All in all it is clear that the discussion of power and policy instruments would has 
been fruitful . Having defined (actor) power as strategic employment of resources greatly 
facilitated the attempt to make sense of the rather uneven literature on policy instruments 
and proved to be a precondition for the attempt to develop a 2+-dimensional perspective 
in which public interventions vis-a-vis private actors are to be assessed not only according 
to the rules and resources involved but also with regard to more specific design features. 
Or to put it another way: innovation with regard to the analysis of policy instrument 
turned out to depend on taking the wider theoretical contexts - institutions, agency and 
power - into account in a systematic fashion. 
196 Both Hood and Salamon tend to enumerate variables without fitting them into an overall perspective of 
power. rules and resources. 
197 See Halkier 1996. 
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4. Premonitions (No Mean Conclusion) 
As announced in the introduction, this paper consisted of three separate, yet related, parts 
the function of which were to provide theoretical underpinning for the development of an 
analyiical framework for empirical investigations. Although the raison d'etre of the text 
is therefore in a sense external, the preceding sections could also be seen to be valuable 
in their own right. On the one hand an institutionalist perspective has been restated, 
hopefully in a more precise manner, with regard to economic and political phenomena and 
the policy process. On the other hand the results of these discussions ultimately made it 
possible to break new theoretical ground in the analysis of policy instruments and their 
relationship to rules, resources and relations of power between public and private actors, 
something that potentially could have significant implications for the study of other areas 
of policy too. 
Having worked our way through successive areas of theoretical enquiry, it is now 
time to return to the concerns that originally prompted the venture by considering the 
implications for the study of regional policy in general, and the transition from traditional 
towards new-model policies in particular. 
Firstly, the contours of an institutionalist perspective on regional policy begins to 
emerge when the insights into economic and political institutions gained in section 1 are 
combined with the general approach to policy analysis developed in section 2 and 
conceptual work undertaken earlier in course of the project."· Figure 14 depicts the basic 
structure of such an analytical framework, and it will be noted that a range of by now 
well-known concerns are very much in evidence: 
- the combination of organizational and strategic features, 
- the interplay between the political process and the problems of the regional economy, 
both in the formulation and design of policies, and in the implementation phase 
through the interaction between frontline bureaucrats and targeted private actors, 
- the social embeddedness of the policy-making process through the relationship 
between the policy-making organization, its political environment and the private 
actors targeted by policy initiatives, 
- the influence of design variables such as rules of interaction, types of resources and 
modes of implementation on the degree to which the outcomes produced by a 
198 Notably Halkier 1992 
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particular policy programme reflect the original political priorities, and 
- the relational nature of policy implementation where the fmal outcome not only 
reflects the nature of state intervention but also the resources, interests, strategies and 
ideological inclinations of the private actors targeted 
are all very much present. Having established the foundations for an analytical framework 
should greatly facilitate the pending conceptual work concerning individual variables by 
serving as an overarching principle of organization and making it easier to draw lessons 
from the existing, and very heterogenous, literature on regional policy. 
Secondly, what may have felt like a long and winding road has not merely been yet 
another rehearsal of well-worn theoretical arguments, but has resulted in a tangible 
improvement upon previous attempts to construct an analytical framework, 199 especially 
with regard to three areas: the role of transaction costs in the process of policy 
formulation, the question of power and policy instruments, and the interaction between 
the implementing organization and targeted private actors. Or to put it another way: things 
are not what they used to be, they have improved. 
The adoption of an institutionalist approach has in other words clearly made it 
possible to impose a coherent perspective that both takes strategic agency and 
institutional/organizational factors into account, and is well-equipped to illuminate the 
distinct characteristics of and complex interaction between public and private 
organizations . All in all this strongly suggests that the next step, the development of a 
199 Something that can easily be established by comparing the comments above with the framework 
described in Halkier 1992. 
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consistent analytical framework specially geared to regional policy should be feasible -
and so the ultimate aim, to be able to make sense of the changing policy paradigms, is 
therefore still very much in sight. In other words : a promising platform would seem to 
have been created . 
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